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Note
Guns & Governance
DENIS J. O'MALLEY III
Every felon in Connecticut-violent and non-violent alike-loses the
right to bear arms upon conviction. But felons convicted of public
corruption offenses in Connecticut and fifteen other states have nothing
between them and the ballot once their sentences expire. Why is that? Why
do these states limit a black-letter right so broadly but leave unregulated
the implied "right" to hold office? Additionally, why is it that in thirteen of
these states lifetime disqualificationfrom office follows impeachment but
not conviction? This Note would have Connecticut and the fifteen similarly
situated states foreclose these questions with laws prohibiting corrupt
politiciansfrom holding office.
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Guns & Governance
DENIS J. O'MALLEY m
I. INTRODUCTION

Convicted in 2003 of felony racketeering and bribery charges,' Joe
Ganim is legally prohibited from possessing a firearm. 2 The state limits his
right to bear arms 3 because, as a felon, he is considered a "presumptively
dangerous' person in the eyes of the law, one who "may not be trusted to
possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society."' Mayor of
Bridgeport, Connecticut, from 1991-2003, Ganim's administration has
been described as the "QVC of graft," 6 a caricature of corruption in which
Ganim conditioned city contracts on his receipt of hundreds of thousands
of dollars in "cash, diamonds, expensive wine, tailored clothing, highpriced meals, and home renovations."
On Nov. 3, 2015, Ganim won re-election as mayor of Bridgeport.'
"Are you kidding me?" commented one state politico. "Joe Ganim
stole from the public trough because he wanted a Mercedes, and not a
Lexus[] and now he's in charge[?]"
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2017; University of Scranton, B.A.
2010. I would like to thank the following: The members of the Connecticut Law Review for their
diligent editing; Professor Douglas Spencer, University of Connecticut School of Law, for his guidance
with this Note; and my parents, Maura and Denis O'Malley, who instilled in my brothers and me a love
and pride of our hometown, Bridgeport, CT, from the first. This Note is dedicated to the city of
Bridgeport, its residents, and all those who recognize the inaccuracy of its current reputation.
' Brief for the United States of America at 4, United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007)
(No. 03-1448-cr.), 2006 WL 6171633.
2 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-217 (2015) (barring felons from possessing firearms); 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (2012).
U.S. CONST. amend. 11 ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."); CONN. CONsT. art. 1, § 15
("Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.").
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 64 (1980).
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977) (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 14773 (daily
ed. May 23, 1968) (statement of Sen. Long)).
6 Colin McEnroe, Ganim's Resurrection Steals Bronin's Thunder, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept.
2
17, 2005), http://www.courant.com/opinion/op-ed/hc-op-mcenroe-ganim-steals-bronins-thunder-09 020150917-column.html [https://perma.cc/JAC8-DLB2].
Christopher Keating & Gregory B. Hladky, Bridgeport Comeback Complete: It's Once Again
Mayor Joe Ganim, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.courant.com/community/
bridgeport/hc-bridgeport-ct-joe-ganim-mary-jane-foster-l 104-20151103-story.html [https://perma.cc/4
5TE-7EXP].
'Id
Id. (quoting J.R. Romano, chairman of the Connecticut Republican Party). Romano's quote
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Yes, indeed. Connecticut, like only fifteen other states, lacks any laws
that would disqualify corrupt politicianso from holding office beyond the
expiration of their criminal sentences." So, while Joe Ganim cannot walk
into a local sports outfitter and purchase a firearm, he is entirely within his
rights to serve as mayor of the largest city in Connecticut.
This Note argues that, like a firearm, public office should be treated as
a potentially dangerous instrument. Once a person uses public office to
effect harm, state law should bar their future possession of the criminal
instrument in the same way that persons convicted of gun-violence
offenses--or, for that matter, any felony at all-are barred from possessing
the instrument of their crimes. Each instrument inflicts injury. Those
injuries are decidedly different, but the harm suffered by cities and states
stigmatized by public corruption should be prevented in the same way
states seek to prevent physical violence inflicted by firearms: by
prohibiting those who have used office for illicit purposes from possessing
it in the future.
This is not to say that gun violence and political corruption pose
equivalent dangers. They certainly do not. The limitation on eligibility for
office proposed in this Note reflects this fact: only that small class of
persons previously convicted of a public corruption offense while in office
should be prohibited from ever again holding office. Compare this with the
approach to felon-in-possession limitations on firearms-a more
substantial risk is accordingly addressed more broadly.1 2 One need not
commit an offense involving a gun or even physical violence in order to
lose his or her Second Amendment right to bear arms." Under the
approach advocated by this Note, one would only lose his or her ability to
included the following question: "We have laws that don't allow felons to vote yet we're going to give
one of them hundreds of millions of dollars in taxpayer money to run a city?" This misunderstands
Connecticut's felon voter disenfranchisement law, which only disqualifies felons from voting until they
complete their sentence. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text
'o Where not otherwise defined by sources cited, "public corruption" can be understood to imply
the "traditional definition stress[ing] commission of an illegal act, an act that violates the formal
standards of a public role for private gain." Susan Welch & John G. Peters, Attitudes of U.S. State
Legislators Toward Political Corruption: Some PreliminaryFindings, 2 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 445, 446
(1977).
" See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46a (2016) (disqualifying felons from voting and holding office
through the completion of their sentences, short any probation period, without providing specifically
for felonies involving public corruption); infra Appendix, Part A (discussing the sixteen states that lack
corrupt-candidate disqualification provisions).
2 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (prohibiting a wide class of offenders from possessing
firearms as opposed to limiting the prohibition to those convicted of offenses related to firearms);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-217(a) (2015).
" In Connecticut, for example, General Statutes section 53a-217 prohibits all felons from
possessing a firearm. § 53a-217(a). Among the felony offenses in the Connecticut General Statutes are
several inherently non-violent crimes, such as stamp forgery, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-347a (2016), and
residential mortgage fraud, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-379a(b) (2016).
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hold office upon conviction of exactly those offenses the prohibition aims
to prevent. The basic point being that if we are convinced a person can no
longer be trusted with a gun by virtue of a felony conviction entirely
unrelated to the use of a firearm, why do we not exercise such caution with
respect to the indispensable instrument of the corrupt politician's offense:

public office?
Some states do. Nine prohibit all felons from holding office.' 4 Twentyfive provide for candidate disenfranchisement in cases of public corruption
offenses." Connecticut too has waded into these waters, though as of last
year's session the legislature apparently did not find them to be quite the
right temperature." Connecticut legislators should take note of a wave of
support for this approach swelling in the distance. In the last decade, three
states-California, Michigan, and Tennessee-created laws barring corrupt
politicians from holding office in response to circumstances similar to
those in Connecticut following the Ganim conviction and that of former
Governor John Rowland.' 7
Additionally, among the sixteen states that do not disenfranchise
candidates previously convicted of crimes related to public office, thirteen
of them do disqualify impeached officials from holding office again." This
incongruence explains why ex-Governor Rowland, now twice convicted of
offenses related either to corruption of office or the electoral system, will
nonetheless be eligible to hold office upon the conclusion of his current
sentence.' 9
" For a discussion of these states' approaches, see infra Appendix, Part C.
"For a discussion of these states' approaches, see infra Appendix, Part B.
1 In the January 2015 session, the Committee on Judiciary considered Raised Bill No. 7052,
which would have prevented the candidacy for office of any public official who has been convicted of
or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to any state or federal offense-felonies and misdemeanors
alike-related to state, municipal, or federal office. Raised Bill No. 7052, 2015 Gen. Assembly
Judiciary Comm., January Sess. (Conn. 2015). The proposed bill would have extended this candidate
disenfranchisement to any person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a

felony offense "committed as a candidate for nomination for election or election to any municipal, state
or federal office .. . or any other felony offense related to such candidate's campaign." Id.

The bill garnered relatively little publicity, which was largely focused on criticism that the bill
arose in response to the candidacy of Joe Ganim. See Brian Lockhart, Ban State's Felonious Pols from
Holding Office Again?, CONN. POST (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.ctpost.com/Iocal/article/Ban-state-s("Bad
[https://perma.ccN3DM-5ESV]
felonious-pols-from-holding-office-6148618.php#page-1
."). Ganim went on to win that election.
Bridgeport politicians helped inspire this recent effort
Kristin Hussey, Joseph Ganim, DisgracedEx-Mayor ofBridgeport, Conn., Wins Back Job, N.Y. TIMES

http://www.nytimes.comi/2015/l1/04/nyregion/joseph-ganim-elected-mayor-of3, 2015),
(Nov.
bridgeport-conn.html? r-0 [https://perma.cc/VW49-F4H3].
" Alison Leigh Cowan, Rowland, Ex-Connecticut Governor, Is Convicted in Campaign Finance

Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/nyregion/rowland-exconnecticut-govemor-found-guilty-of-corruption.html [https://perma.cc/2EYV-CYM7]; see infra Part
II.C (discussing circumstances leading to candidate disenfranchisement legislation in these states).
'Infra Appendix., Part A.
9Infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
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This Note takes the position that Connecticut should render the
plurality of states the majority by enacting legislation or amending its
constitution so as to disqualify persons convicted of public-corruption
offenses from holding office. This Note is not concerned with voter
disenfranchisement of such persons, though the construction of
Connecticut's2 o and many states' 2 1 candidate-eligibility laws necessitates
some discussion of their various approaches to that disqualification as well.
This Note also does not take the position that all felons ought to lose their
privilege to hold office. Rather, the best approach is the particularized one.
This approach would require that corrupt politicians serve their time and
any attendant period of parole and/or probation and that the state return
such persons' voting rights to them thereafter but permanently bar them
from holding office. Fool me once, more or less.
II. CANDIDATE DISENFRANCHISEMENT ACROSS THE COUNTRY

A. Connecticut'sApproach
Connecticut and fifteen other states currently take what might be called
a "forgive and forget" approach to voter and, by extension, candidate
disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement.22 Under Connecticut General
Statutes § 9-46, persons convicted of a felony and committed to a
correctional institution forfeit their right to vote and the privileges that
right entails. Such persons only become eligible to hold office again once
they take the appropriate steps to regain that privilege.23 In order to regain
franchise privileges, a convicted felon must complete his or her prison
sentence and any period of parole.24 A period of probation need not elapse
before one regains the right to vote, however.2 5 Section 9-46a additionally
§ 9-46 (2016).
See Andrea Steinacker, The Prisoner's Campaign: Felony DisenfranchisementLaws and the
Right to Hold Public Office, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REv. 801, 806 (identifying fourteen states that, like
2

CONN. GEN. STAT.

21

Connecticut, "link[] qualification for office to voter qualifications").

' Infra Appendix., Part A23 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46 (2016) (emphasis added):
(a) A person shall forfeit such person's right to become an elector and such person's
privileges as an elector upon conviction of a felony and committal to the custody of
the Commissioner of Correction for confinement in a correctional institution or
facility or a community residence, committal to confinement in a federal
correctional institution or facility, or committal to the custody of the chief
correctional official of any other state or a county of any other state for confinement
in a correctional institution or facility or a community residence in such state or
county.
(b) No person who has forfeited and not regained such person's privileges as an
elector, as provided in section 9-46a, may be a candidate for or hold public office.
24 id.
25 See id. Connecticut, Califomia, Colorado, and New York are the only
states that allow felony
probationers to vote but disenfranchise both felony inmates and parolees. THE SENTENCING PROJECT,

2016]
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requires the individual to pay all criminal fines associated with their
conviction.2 6 Once this has been accomplished, the individual regains the
right to vote, is given a document certifying their release from prison and
discharge from parole, and has their privileges as an elector restored so
long as they reside in the same municipality within which they resided at
the time of their conviction.2 7 If the person was not an elector at the time of
their conviction or if they reside in a different municipality upon their
release and/or discharge, they must also "submit[] to an admitting official
satisfactory proof of the person's qualifications to be admitted as an
elector."2 8
This scheme puts Connecticut in a roughly one-third minority of states
that do not disenfranchise candidates who have been convicted of felonies
involving public corruption once they have completed their sentences.2 9
B. The Constitutionalityoflimposing Qualificationsfor Public Office
It is well settled that Connecticut's legislature can impose
qualifications on holding office. Such qualifications for voting and/or
holding office are comfortably within the bounds of ballot-access
restrictions permitted by the federal Constitution. The United States
Supreme Court has never addressed candidate qualification specifically in
the context of felon disenfranchisement, but it has "held that states can
impose procedural limitations on who can appear on a ballot" in order to
ensure the orderly operation of elections.30
While state laws regulating elections-including candidate
qualifications, voter registration procedures, and the voting process itselfmay "inevitably affect[]" one's right to vote and his or her "right to
associate with others for political ends," a state's interest in conducting
orderly elections is "generally sufficient to justify reasonable,

FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT

LAWS

IN THE UNITED STATES (April 2014), http://sentencing

project.org/doc/publications/fdFelony%/20Disenfranchisement%/o20Laws%20in%20the%2OUS.pdf
[https://permacc/XZD6-JEAB]. South Dakota had also taken this approach to voter disenfranchisement
but in 2012 amended the relevant statute to disenfranchise felony probationers as well. Compare S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 12-4-18 (2015), with 2012 S.D. Sess. Laws Ch. 82 (1H1B 1247). South Dakota house
bill 1247 changed the language of § 12-4-18 to require that "[a]ny voter identified as deceased or who
is serving a sentence for a felony conviction . . . be removed from the voter registration records" from
its previous version, which required only that those "voter[s] identified as deceased or who receive[] a

felony sentence to the adult state penitentiary system including a suspended execution of a sentence
shall be removed from the voter registration records." 2012 S.D. Sess. Laws Ch. 82 (RB 1247).
26 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46a(a)
(2016).
27 § 9-46a(b).
28 Id.
29 Infra Appendix, Part A (discussing the sixteen states that lack such provisions).
o Steinacker, supra note 21, at 813 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983);
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974)).
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nondiscriminatory restrictions."" The question cannot be reduced to a
"litmus-paper test." 32 Rather, courts must weigh the injury to the
disqualified candidate's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
against the interests identified by the state as justifications for "the burden
imposed by its rule."3 3 Additionally, courts must consider the necessity of
the burden before deciding "whether the challenged provision is
unconstitutional." 34
State courts have interpreted Supreme Court precedent in this area "to
mean that states can preclude convicted felons from running for office." 35
As Andrea Steinacker points out in The Prisoner's Campaign: Felony
DisenfranchisementLaws and the Right to Hold Public Office, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals provided one example of this
interpretation in State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney.36 There, the court
contrasted ballot restrictions that serve a valid public purpose and result
only in "incidental limitations on the franchise" against ballot restrictions
that do not serve a valid public purpose and thus effect an unconstitutional
"simple restriction" of the franchise.37
Though the Maloney case concerned limitations on successive
gubernatorial terms, the court identified the requirement that candidates for
office "not be under conviction for a felony" as one example of a
constitutional limitation imposed "in a valid attempt to insure wisdom,
dignity, responsiveness, and competence in public officials."" Following
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' issuance of a writ of
mandamus to preclude Governor Arch A. Moore, Jr. from seeking a third
consecutive term, 3 the U.S. Supreme Court tellingly dismissed Moore's
appeal "for want of [a] substantial federal question." 40
The constitutionality of candidate disenfranchisement is further
underscored
by
the
Supreme
Court's
upholding
of voter
" Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788; see also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) ("In
approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of
their impact on voters.").
32

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (citations omitted).
1Id
3 Id
3s Steinacker, supra note 21, at 813-14.
' Id (citing State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607, 611 (W. Va. 1976), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976)).
3 Maloney, 223 S.E.2d at 611.
33

38

id.

Id. at 610. As it happens, a few years later Moore did return to the governor's office for a nonconsecutive third term, after which he pleaded guilty to charges that he used the office to extort
$573,000 from a coal company receiving refunds from the state's black lung fund. Associated Press,
39

Ex-West

Virginia Governor Admits

Corruption Schemes,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Apr.

13,

http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/13/us/ex-west-virginia-govemor-admits-corruption-schemes.html
[https://perma-cc/Y8SL-PP24].
* Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976).

1990),
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disenfranchisement laws, as "the rights of voters and the rights of
candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect
candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on
voters."4 1
Moreover, the question of whether such limitations are legally valid on
the state level is answered definitively by the state of these laws across the
country. A total of thirty-four states currently impose candidate
disenfranchisement either on felons generally or specifically on persons
convicted of offenses related to public corruption.42 Whether and to what
extent legislatures can impose such qualifications for office depends on the
construction of a given state's constitution. This legal hurdle is overcome
by passing a constitutional amendment effecting the disqualification or
empowering the legislature to do so, as at least two states have done in the
candidate and voter disenfranchisement contexts in the last sixteen years. 43
The necessity of this process is exemplified by Minnesota, where in
4' Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). Absent discrimination, states are free to establish
qualifications for the right to vote. Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51
(1959). Felon disenfranchisement has been specifically-and, so far, definitively-upheld against a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge in Richardson v. Ramirez, where the Court held that "the exclusion
of felons from the.vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 418 U.S. 24,
54 (1974).
Since Richardson, challenges made under the Voting Rights Act (VRA), Voting Rights Act of
1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973ff-6 (2016), on the theory of a disparate impact of felon
disenfranchisement laws on persons of color have also failed. Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th
Cir. 2010); Steinacker, supra note 21, at 811 (citing Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (en
bane), aff'g by an equally divided court Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y 1993)). The VRA
discussion is practically irrelevant here, though. The predominant impact of felon voter
disenfranchisement can be said to be on persons of color due to their disproportionate representation in
our nation's prisons. See MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN
JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 3, 19 (2007),
http://www.sentencingprojectorg/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Uneven-Justice-State-Rates-of-incarcer
ation-by-Race-and-Ethnicity.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6VS-TNWU] (noting that "African Americans are
incarcerated at nearly six . . . times the rate of whites" and "Hispanics are incarcerated at nearly
double .. . the rate of whites," resulting in "declining political influence through high rates of felony
disenfranchisement").
But felon candidate disenfranchisement would not have such an effect. It is an unflattering
commentary on this country, but the racial makeup of each level of government presents no significant
risk of disparate impact on persons of color by candidate disenfranchisement laws. As of 2012, ninetytwo percent of the nation's governors were white, the state legislatures of the country's five most
diverse states contained an underrepresentation of persons of color, only sixty-one percent of local
government executives in the nation's eighteen most diverse counties were identified as people of
color, and city councils in the nation's most diverse cities had underrepresentations of people of color
as well. NAT'L URBAN FELLOWS, DIVERSITY COUNTS: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY AMONG
PUBLIC SERVICE LEADERSHIP 5 (2012), http://www.nuforg/sites/default/files/Documents/NUFdivers
itycountsV2FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cec/T223-Q85U].
4 See infra Appendix, Parts B, C.
4 For example, in 2010, Michigan passed just such an amendment in order to disqualify corrupt
politicians from office. See infra Appendix, Part B. Massachusetts passed an amendment in 2000 to
disqualify incarcerated felons from voting. Id.
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1979 the state Supreme Court struck down a statute, later repealed, that
barred persons whose elections had been annulled due to a violation of the
state's Fair Campaign Practices Act from running for office during the
term for which they had run in the annulled election." The court there
found that such a qualification for office violated the state's constitution by
adding to the qualifications set forth in Article VII, section 6.4 The court's
application of that section had "consistently held that, as a guarantee of
universal eligibility for public office, its standards may not be made more
restrictive by legislative action unless expressly authorized by another
constitutionalprovision."" Minnesota's constitution lacked a provision
expressly authorizing the legislature to impose stricter standards of
eligibility for public office by statute,47 which was the dispositive factor in
the court's constitutional analysis of the qualification for office.
Where such provisions are contained in state constitutions, though,
legislatures are free to prescribe qualifications for office so long as they are
in accord with the constitutional grant of power. New Jersey provides one
such example. In a suit against the Bergen County Supervisor of Elections,
a state resident whose conviction subjected him to lifetime supervision
challenged the accordant lifetime suspension of his voting rights under
state statute." The court found the statute's application proper and in
accordance with the Constitution's grant of power to the legislature.49
Connecticut's legislature need not jump any constitutional hurdles to
pass such a law either. Article VI, Section 3 of the Connecticut
"Pavlak v. Growe, 284 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Minn. 1979). The statute in question provided that:
A candidate elected to an office, and whose election thereto has been annulled and
set aside for any offense mentioned in sections 210A01 to 210A.44, shall not,
during the period fixed by law as the term of such office, be appointed or elected to
fill any vacancy which may occur in such office. A candidate or other person who is
convicted of any offense mentioned in sections 210A.01 to 210A.44, shall not,
during the period fixed by law as the term of the office with respect to which the
election was held and said offense was committed, be appointed or elected to fill any
vacancy in such office. Any appointment or election to an office made in violation
of or contrary to the provisions of this section shall be void. Minn. Stat. § 210A-39
(Repealed by Laws 1988, c. 578, art. 2, § 12).
Id.
45 Id. (citing MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 6) (limiting qualifications for office to those imposed by
the state or federal constitution).
4 Pavak, 284 N.W.2d at 176 (emphasis added).
4 See MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (providing all qualified voters are eligible to hold office "except
as otherwise provided in this constitution, or the constitution and law of the United States") (emphasis
added).
4 Hunt v. Supervisor of Elections, No. L-7371-05, 2005 WL 2978737, at * I (N.J. Super. Ct. Nov.
7, 2005); N.J. STAT. § 19:4-1 (2016) (disqualifying from voting persons "serving a sentence or [] on
parole or probation as the result of a conviction").
49 Hunt, 2005 WL 2978737, at *1 ("The New Jersey Constitution Art. It, § 1, 1 7, provides that
the Legislature may pass laws to deprive persons of the right to suffrage who shall be convicted of such
crimes as it may designate.") (emphasis added).

GUNS & GO VERNA NCE

2016]1

1357

Constitution expressly empowers-if not requires-the General Assembly

to "by law prescribe the offenses on conviction of which the right to be an
elector and the privileges of an elector shall be forfeited and the conditions
on which and methods by which such rights may be restored."50 This
language came from two amendments-passed in 1948 and 1974-to
Article VI, Section 3 of Connecticut's Constitution." The previous
language provided specifically that conviction of "bribery, forgery,
perjury, dueling, fraudulent bankruptcy, theft, or other offense for which an
infamous punishment is inflicted" forfeited one's privileges as an elector.52
The amended language provided the legislature with the authority
necessary to impose the state's criminal voting disenfranchisement statute,
which extends the disqualification from the few offenses provided by the
previous constitutional language to conviction of any felony-federal or
state.53
Since then, the statute has only once been challenged on the basis of its
effect on eligibility for office. In Sweeney v. Burns,54 the plaintiff had been
elected to the town of Trumbull's board of finance for a four-year term in
November 1975.5' The following February, the plaintiff was indicted in
federal court on a felony offense of possession of an unregistered firearm.56
He pleaded guilty in July of 1976.5' His sentence was limited to a fine of
$2,500, which he paid in October 1976."
The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction to prevent the town's
registrar of voters from removing his name from the town's list of electors
pursuant to section 9-46, which would have rendered him ineligible to
continue his term of office.59 What is interesting about this case is that the
plaintiff's criminal sentence-a fine-had already been "completed" (paid)
by the time the registrar of voters received official notice of his conviction
from the secretary of state in January of 1977.60 While section 9-46
triggered forfeiture of the plaintiff's right to vote and its attendant

5 CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
51 CONN. CONST. amend. Art. XLVI; CONN. CONST. amend. Art. V1l; WESLEY W. HORTON, THE
CONNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTION 158 (2d ed. 2012) ("Article XLVI of the amendments, adopted in

1948, completely rewrote [Article VI, Section 3] to read as it is today, except that the phrase, 'the right
to be an elector and,' was added in 1974 by Article VII of the amendments to the 1965 constitution.").

Borino v. Gen. Registrars of Voters, 86 Conn. 622, 622 (1913).
§ 9-46 (2015) (removing the privileges of an elector upon felony conviction
for the duration of sentence).
' 377 A.2d 338 (Conn. C.P. 1977).
55
Id. at 338.
52

53 CONN. GEN. STAT.

56

Id

558 Id.
Id
59

Id. at 339.
6o Id. at 338-39
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privileges-including holding office -upon his guilty plea in July 1976,
section 9-46a required that they be restored to the plaintiff and his name
returned to the list of electors upon completion of his sentence. 62 The
defendant completed his sentence in October 1976, before the registrar
even became formally aware of the conviction.
The constitutional issue that "troubled" Judge Kinney of the Court of
Common Pleas at Bridgeport was the "total failure of s 9-46 to provide any
procedural safeguards in the nature of notice and a right to a hearing before
the loss of such valuable rights as electoral privileges."63 While town
registrars of voters were and remain statutorily obligated to issue "written
notice . .. by certified mail" before removing the names of convicts from
voter registries,' that procedure applied "only to felony convictions in a
state court."
The plaintiff in Sweeney had pleaded guilty and been
sentenced in federal court,' a conviction that did not then and still does not
trigger notice under section 9-45.67
While "troubled" by the due process implications of this gap in the
statutory regime, the court stopped short of declaring section 9-46
unconstitutional. In noting that "a statute forfeiting electoral rights of
convicted felons may be constitutionally authorized," Judge Kinney
observed that this does not free the legislature "of all constitutional
restraints on how that forfeiture may be accomplished," pointing
specifically to the requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard.6 8
Ultimately, after identifying section 9-46 as "clearly penal in nature," the
court limited its holding to a requirement that the statute be strictly
construed, which in the circumstances of that case precluded removal of
the plaintiff from the town's voter registry and the forfeiture of his office
that would have resulted.69
Despite this gap in notice provisions prior to voter-and, by extension,
candidate-disenfranchisement, the Connecticut legislature has yet to close
up the void in the statutory regime with respect to federal convicts and, for
that matter, persons convicted of felonies in other states. Nearly forty years
61
62

CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46(b) (2015).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46a (2015).

Sweeney, 377 A.2d at 339.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 9-45 (2015).
65 Sweeney, 377 A.2d at
339.
6
Id. at 338.
67 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 9-45 (2015) (requiring the state Commissioner
of Correction to
transmit to the Secretary of State "a list of all persons who . . . have been convicted in the Superior
61

64

Court of a felony" and for the secretary to in turn transmit such lists to the proper town's registrar of

voters who, after sending notice by certified mail, must remove such persons' names from the proper
voter registry lists). The statute does not contain any such notice procedure for persons convicted of
felonies in federal court.
" Sweeney, 337 A.2d at 339-40.
69 Id. at 340 (citing Dental Comm'n v. Tm-Fit Plastics, Inc., 269
A.2d 265, 267 (Conn. 1970)).
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after Judge Kinney's opinion in Sweeney, the statutes it implicates have not
changed with respect to providing federal convicts with pre-deprivation
notice of their imminent removal from voter registries. It is not a case of
which the state's legislature is unaware, one would at least assume. The
case is cited in the General Statues beneath sections 9-45, 9-46a, and 9-46,
where the citation is accompanied by the statement that the "[s]ection fails
to provide any procedural safeguards in the nature of notice and right to
hearing before loss of such valuable rights as electoral privileges," an
explanatory note that overlooks Sweeney's distinction between state and
federal convictions.70
The Connecticut Supreme Court has also upheld the constitutionality
of section 9-46, though on different grounds. State v. Kreminskil did not
directly address the effect of a felony conviction on the convict's eligibility
for office. Rather, the court held that although the "felony classification
given to the crimes committed by the defendant may also have involved a
forfeiture of his rights as an elector until payment of the fines and
completion of the period of probation," that "additional consequence" did
not "render the sentence so grossly disproportionate to the offense as to
breach the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment."72
C. Recent Examples of States that Responded to Public Corruption
Scandals with CandidateDisenfranchisementLaws
Not only are laws limiting candidates' office-holding franchise
constitutional, recent history demonstrates their relevance. In just the last
nine years, at least three states did what Connecticut should have done in
the wake of the Ganim and Rowland convictions. In response to similar
circumstances, Tennessee, Michigan, and California each responded to
corruption scandals with laws or constitutional amendments effecting some
measure of disqualification from office upon conviction of an offense
related to public office.
1. Tennessee
Prior to 2007, Tennessee law did not distinguish between ordinary
citizens and office-holders in terms of disqualifying felons from holding
office.73 Under the relevant state statute, a person convicted of a felony was
only then ineligible to vote or hold office until their citizenship rights had
70 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-45, 9-46, 9-46(a) (2015); see Sweeney, 377 A.2d at 339 (noting that the
section 9-45 notice provision applies only to felony convictions in a state court).
n 422 A.2d 294 (Conn. 1979).
' Id. at 298 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-114 (West 2006), amended by TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-114
(West 2007).
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been restored, similar to Connecticut's current approach. The statute also
made no mention of removal from office upon conviction.
Enter "Operation Tennessee Waltz," a state and federal investigation
that resulted in the arrests of seven lawmakers on bribery charges in
addition to four other arrests.76 Among those arrested was then-Tennessee
State Senator John Ford, a thirty-one-year veteran of the state's legislature
who was convicted of taking $55,000 in bribes and sentenced to five and a
half years in prison. Surreptitiously recorded video caught Ford accepting
a $5,000 bribe." A wiretap captured Ford telling an undercover agent
posing as a lobbyist to "send [him] a little money" in return for his
influence.7 9
In the fallout from the "Waltz" scandal, Tennessee's legislature passed
a slew of ethics reforms.so These included an amendment to the abovementioned statute,8 ' a measure that its architect would later describe as a
"bill . . . aimed at any SOB that disgraced his office. . . . Democrat or
Republican, past or future." 82 The amended statute, which came into effect
on July 1, 2007, provides that any person convicted of a felony while in
office on or after that date will be removed from office. 83 Additionally, if
the felony was committed "in the person's official capacity" or in a way
involving their official duties, they are forever disqualified from holding
office regardless of whether their rights are restored." The voting rights of
a sitting official convicted of such an offense are not affected beyond their
suspension for the duration of the sentence, including parole." If a felony
was not related to one's official duties-or, if the offender was not holding
office-the offender is still only disqualified from holding office until their
74

STAT. §§ 9-46, 9-46a (2015).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-114 (West 2006), amended by TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-114
(West 2007).
76 George Poague, Vigilance Can Defeat Corruption, LEAF-CHRONICLE, Dec. 11, 2008, at 2B;

1d; CONN. GEN.

7

Bonna Johnson, As FordGoes to Prison, Ethics Laws on Trial, TENNESSEAN, Aug. 29, 2007.
" Johnson, supra note 76.
71 Woody Baird, Tenn. Lawmaker on Tape: Send Me Money, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2007),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2007/04/13/AR2007041301275.html/ [https://
permacc/KC2R-CREX].
7 Id The Ganim investigation in Bridgeport, CT-"Operation Hardball"-included a similarly
bald utterance: "Lennie," Ganim was recorded saying to an associate also prosecuted in the case, "you

are making all of this money because of me, and you can not make it because of me." Brief for the
United States of America at 3, 8, United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134 (2007) (No. 03-1448-cr.),
2006 WL 6171633 (emphasis added).
' Johnson, supra note 76.
81 Id.

' Chris Carroll, Crutchfield Comeback? Tennessee Waltz May Not Have Been Ex-lawmaker's

Last Turn on the Floor, TIMES FREE PRESS (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/
news/story/2012/sep/16/dancing-around-the-question/88089/ (https://pernacc/ZUY8-Q2D7].
83 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-114 (West 2007).
8 Id
85
d; TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-143 (West 2016).
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citizenship rights have been restored,1 as had been the case prior to the
amendment.87 Like that of Connecticut, the Tennessee Constitution
provides the state's legislature with power to make this law."
What is particularly interesting about Tennessee's approach is its
(attempted) appeasement of the retroactivity issue. Politicians previously
convicted of a felony related to office prior to the law's effective date who
were again in office when the law came into effect in July 2007 would
have been permitted to serve out their ongoing term and only then would
they become disqualified from future office-holding.89 A clever if
superfluous provision, it likely could have been successfully challenged by
an affected office holder--one convicted of a felony related to their office
prior to July 2007 yet nonetheless currently sitting in office again-as a
retrospective or ex post facto law in violation of the state constitution.90
2. Michigan
Michigan's Constitution had long taken an office-by-office approach
to candidate qualifications. In the case of legislators, it provided for a
twenty-year ban on holding office for state representatives or senators
convicted of a felony "involving a breach of public trust." 91
Then came the Kwame Administration. In 2008, then-Detroit Mayor
Kwame Kilpatrick pleaded guilty to two counts of obstruction of justice
committed while in office.9 2 Kilpatrick also pleaded no contest to an

16

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-20-114

8 TENN. CODE ANN.

(West 2016).

§ 40-20-114 (West 2006), amended by

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-20-114

(West 2016).
8 Compare TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("Laws may be passed excluding from the right of suffrage
persons who may be convicted of infamous crimes."), with CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("The general

assembly shall by law prescribe the offenses on conviction of which the right to be an elector and the
privileges of an elector shall be forfeited and the conditions on which and methods by which such
rights may be restored.").
9 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-114(c) (West 2016).
9 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("[No retrospective law, or law impairing the obligations of
contracts, shall be made."); TENN. CONST. art. 1,

§

11 ("[L]aws made for the punishment of acts

committed previous to the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal, are contrary to
the principles of a free Government; wherefore no Ex post facto law shall be made."). There has not

been a case on this point in Tennessee. Though, at least with respect to a retrospective law challenge,
the decision would ultimately turn on whether §40-20-114(c) is considered procedural, remedial, or
neither of the two. Comm'rs of Powell-Clinch Util. Dist. v. Util. Mgmt. Review Bd., 427 S.W.3d 375,
384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) ("[T]he retrospective application of a law that is procedural or remedial in
nature is not prohibited unless application of that law would impair a contract obligation or a vested
right."). One could argue that office holding is not a vested right and so this provision, while
retrospective in a sense, is not prohibited.
'

MICH. CONST. art. IV,

§

7 (barring state legislators convicted of a felony involving "a breach

of the public trust" within the preceding twenty years from holding office).
' M.L. Elrick et al., Ban on Felons in Office Passes, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 3, 2010, at E6.
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assault charge. A city council member and members of Kilpatrick's
administration were also convicted of offenses committed while in office.94
Kilpatrick resigned as part of a plea deal to settle a total of ten felony
charges against him. 95 As part of the deal, Kilpatrick also agreed to repay
$1 million to the city, forfeit his law license, and abstain from running for
office for five years.' On the night he resigned, Kilpatrick proclaimed:
"Y'all done set me up for a comeback."
Next came the "Kwame Amendment," proposed in 2010 as a
response to the Kilpatrick administration's downfall-a "seven-month
political soap opera that consumed the city."'" In November 2010,
Michigan voters approved the Kwame Amendment to create Article 11,
§ 8,io' which took the existing twenty-year ban on legislators from holding
office following certain felony convictions and widened it. The twentyyear ban now applies to all state, local, and federal 0 2 offices as well as
state and local jobs in which the individual has discretionary authority over
public assets.' Felonies that trigger the twenty-year disqualification are
those "involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or a breach of the public
trust ...

related to the person's official capacity ...

[in] elective office or

position of employment in local, state, or federal government.""
3. California
The California Constitution has long disqualified candidates convicted
of having given or received bribes specifically to win election or receive an

" Corey Williams & Ed White, Detroit Mayor Kilpatrick Pleads Guilty and Resigns, CRAIN'S
DETROIT BUSINESS (Sept. 4, 2008), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20080904/FREF809049991/
kilpatrick-pleads-guilty-resigns [https://permacc/4NJK-5KMM].
9 Application of Constitutional Provision Prohibiting Election to Office of Person Convicted of
Felony, Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. 7273, 2013 WL 4490318, at *5 (Aug. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Mich.
A.G.].
* Williams & White, supra note 93.
* Id.
" Elrick et al., supra note 92.
9 Id.
9 Mich. A.G., supra note 94.
'*

P.J. Huffstutter, Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick Pleads Guilty to Felonies, Resigns, L.A.

TIMES (Sept. 5, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/05/nation/na-kilpatrick5 [https://permacc/
6CPS-D53T].
`o' EBrick et al., supranote 92.
102 The inclusion of federal office in Michigan's disqualification of certain felons from holding
office almost certainly violates the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 783 (1995) ("Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional
service would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing
the people of the United States. If the qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution are to be
changed, that text must be amended.").
03 MICH. CONST. art. Xl, § 8.

1 Id.
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appointment to state office. 05 A statute passed in 2012 extended this
prohibition to persons convicted of offering or receiving a bribe, regardless
of the context.'" It also includes as disqualifying offenses "embezzlement
of public money, extortion or theft of public money, perjury, [and]
conspiracy to commit any of those crimes."107
The disqualifying statute-termed the "Elective Office Felony
Conviction Law"-came as a reaction to the 2012 election, which put
voters in one legislative district "between a rock and a hard place" as they
chose between one candidate facing felony charges related to voter fraud
and another who stood accused (by his opponent in the election) of insider
trading to obtain an interest-free loan from the City of Los Angeles.' An
additional six legislators seeking re-election that year also had recent arrest
records, including one charged with perjury and voter fraud.' 09

III. CONNECTICUT AND THE FIFTEEN STATES WITH SIMILAR APPROACHES
TO CANDIDATE DISENFRANCHISEMENT SHOULD IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON
CORRUPT POLITICIANS' ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE

If Connecticut and the fifteen additional states that do not
disenfranchise corrupt candidates can do so, the question becomes why
should they.
Three reasons: First, Connecticut, the federal government, and each of
the fifteen additional states in question impose felon-in-possession
limitations on gun ownership-a black-letter Constitutional right-for
reasons that just as readily support disqualifying corrupt politicians from
holding office, which might be more accurately characterized as a
privilege.'o
Second, Connecticut and another twelve states that lack provisions
effecting disqualification upon a criminal conviction for public corruption
offenses contradictorily impose permanent disqualification from office
upon impeachment.
And third, lawmakers should pass such laws to prevent the economic
'o CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (disqualifying from holding "any office of profit in this State ...
[anyone] convicted of having given or offered a bribe to procure personal election or appointment").
' CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20 (2016).
107

Id.

'" Kevin Heitz, Chapter160: Felons Who Violate "PublicTrust" Bannedfrom Elected Office, 44
MCGEORGE L. REv. 639, 639-40 (2013).
'0 Id. at 639.
"o Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 608 (1978) ("There is no express constitutional provision
guaranteeing any individual the right to become a candidate for public office."); JOHN MARTINEZ, 2
LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 10:1 (2015) (footnotes omitted) (observing that some courts have
characterized "office holding as a privilege rather than a right"). But see Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 787 (1983) (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968)) (including "the right of
individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs" as a fundamental right that, like the
right to vote, is "among our most precious freedoms").
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damage that public corruption inflicts on states and municipalities where it
occurs.
A.

The Logic Supporting Felon-in-PossessionLimitations on Firearms
Supports Corrupt-CandidateDisenfranchisement

Connecticut and federal statutes provide that a person convicted of a
felony cannot ever again possess a firearm."' The purpose of
Connecticut's felon-in-possession statute is "to keep all firearms ... away
from felons."ll2 In discussing the analogous federal statute,"l 3 the United
States Supreme Court has permitted this deprivation of a constitutional
right' 14 because, in committing their crime, the felon or violent
misdemeanant reveals his or her self to be a "presumptively dangerous""s
person who "may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a
threat to society."" 6
In justifying these limitations, the Court relied on the legislative
history of a predecessor statute to what is now codified at U.S.C. § 922(g).
That statute was an attempt "to bar possession of a firearm [by] persons
whose prior behaviors have established their violent tendencies."" 7 in
arguing for the law, Senator Russell B. Long laid out a logical basis for
felon-in-possession limitations on firearms. Connecticut legislators ought
to keep this logic in mind when considering particularized candidate
disenfranchisement:
[T]his amendment is based on the theory in law that every
dog is entitled to one bite. A person who is not a lawyer
might say, "How could you arrive at that conclusion?"
That is based on the old theory that if one owns a dog
and the dog attacks his neighbor, the owner is not liable if he
did not know that the dog was dangerous. But if the dog
" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-217 (2016); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
State v. Zapadka, 873 A.2d 270, 274, 255 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004).

112
113

18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g) (2012).

114 U.S. CONST. amend. 1 ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free

State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15
("Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.").
115 Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 64 (1980).
...
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977) (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 14773
(daily ed. May 23, 1968) (statement of Sen. Long)).
" 114 CONG. REc. 14773 (daily ed. May 23, 1968) (statement of Sen. Long). This reasoning is
consistent with the Connecticut Supreme Court's discussion of the state's felon-in-possession statute.
Connecticut legislators may impose such limitations on the right to bear arms contained in article first,
§ 15 of the state Constitution so long as the law is reasonable. Benjamin v. Bailey, 234 Conn. 455, 465
(1995) (reaffirming notion that "reasonable regulation of the right to bear arms" does not violate article
first, § 15). This ability arises from the state's "police power to protect the health, safety and morals of
the citizenry." Id. at 467.
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attacks one neighbor, and it is a serious injury, and thereafter
attacks someone else, the owner is on notice that the dog is
dangerous.
This amendment would proceed on the theory that every
burglar, thief, assassin, and murderer is entitled to carry a
gun until the commission of his first felony; but, having done
that, he is then subject to being denied the right to use those
weapons again.
SEVERAL SENATORS: Vote! Vote!"'
Sen. Long argued that felons are one category of persons who "have
demonstrated that they are dangerous, or that they may become dangerous.
Stated simply, they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without
becoming a threat to society."ll9 Sen. Long cited the assassination of
Martin Luther King Jr. by a convicted felon to demonstrate the absurdity of
allowing felons to lawfully possess firearms upon release from prison,
enabling them to "kill again."' 20
In the sense of prior instances of unlawful use motivating future
restrictions on possession, the same logic that applies to guns should also
apply to public office. Just as Sen. Long sought to protect against
murderers who might kill again, Connecticut law should protect against
politicians who would corrupt again, so to speak. Put another way, if felons
are considered "presumptively dangerous" and not to be trusted with
firearms by virtue of their violent history, we should consider politicians
with convictions related to their office as "presumptively corrupt" and so
not to be trusted with office.
This reasoning is not entirely novel. In applying a provision of its state
constitutionl21 that specifically disenfranchises corrupt candidates, the
Supreme Court of Delaware emphasized that these "character provision[s]"
are grounded in the idea that conviction of a felony involving corruption of
office is "irreversible evidence that the offender does not possess the
requisite character for public office. . . . [w]ithout question, . . . a
demanding norm."1 2 2 It is a demanding norm and it should be, for reasons
"1l

114 CONG. REC.

14775 (daily ed. May 23, 1968) (statement of Sen. Long).

9

" Id. at 14773.
120 Id.

121 DEL. CONST. art. I1, § 21 ("No person who shall be convicted of embezzlement of the public

money, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the
General Assembly, or capable of holding any office of trust, honor or profit under this State.").
"Infamous crime" here does not include all felonies. Infra, Appendix, Part B, Section 4.
22 State ex rel. Wier v. Peterson, 369 A.2d 1076, 1080-81 (Del. 1976) (emphasis added)
(describing DEL. CONST. art. 11, § 21 as "essentially a character provision[,]" the purpose of which is to
"mandate[e] that all candidates for State office possess high moral qualities."). If this reasoning sounds
somehow anachronistic, note that the Delaware Supreme Court directly quoted this language to make
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well-articulated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in its analysis of a
similar provision:123
Elected public officials are entrusted with the public welfare
and are duty-bound to treat that trust with the highest
standards of care, honesty, and informed independence of
judgment. They are charged to act in the interest of the public
only, not themselves, and they are obligated to maintain the
reality and the appearance of personal disinterestedness in
matters affecting their public duties.' 24
Public officials are "charged to act in the interest of the public only, not
themselves."l2 5 Once one reveals his or herself to lack the requisite
dedication to this maxim, he or she ought not to be trusted with office
again.
To adopt Sen. Long's dog bite analogy, the public official is the dog
and the constituency and its representatives in the legislature are the dog's
owners. Just as the dog biting a neighbor reveals its violent nature, the
official's bribery or like offense reveals that person's corrupt nature. No
one can really blame the dog's owner for the first bite, but thereafter the
owner is on notice and ought to take preventative measures. So too should
voters and legislatures following instances of public corruption. Where the
dog owner should invest in a muzzle, legislatures should impose laws
specifically disenfranchising corrupt politicians, just as Tennessee,
Michigan, and California have.1 26
The reason Connecticut should apply restrictions on office like its
restrictions on gun possession is that both guns and public office inflict
injuries that we should avoid. Guns inflict physical injury and death.
Government corruption injures state and local economies. 127 This is not to
say that these injuries are equivalent. But then neither are the rights to
possess the instruments that inflict these injuries. One need look no further
than the U.S. or Connecticut Constitutions to find the text providing the
right to bear arms.' 28 The right to hold office, though? That takes a bit

more digging.
No right to hold public office appears alongside the right to vote in the
this point more recently in In re Request of Governorfor Advisory Opinion, 950 A.2d 651, 653 (Del.
2008).
123 PA. CONST. art. II,

§7

(disqualifying from holding office persons "convicted of embezzlement

of public moneys, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime"). This provision is broader than the nearly
identical provision in Delaware, as Pennsylvania courts take "infamous crime" to include all felonies.

Infra Appendix, Part C, Section 8.
124 In re Petition of Hughes, 516 Pa. 90, 99
(1987).
125 Id. (emphasis added).
126 See sUpra Part L.C.
1- See infra Part Ill.C.
' U.S. CONST. amend. 11; CONN. CONsT. art. 1, § 15.
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U.S. Constitution.129 Rather, the right to hold office is viewed more as a
logical consequence of the right to vote.o That said, the Supreme Court
has identified holding office-or, at least, "the right of individuals to
associate for the advancement of political beliefs"-as a "fundamental"
right which "rank[s] among our most precious freedoms." 3 1
The Connecticut Constitution also does not attach any explicit right to
hold office to its provision of the right to vote or its guarantee of free
suffrage.132 The Connecticut Supreme Court has said as much: "[t]here is
no express constitutional provision guaranteeing any individual the right to
become a candidate for public office."' 3 3 Rather, as in the federal
Constitution, under Connecticut's Constitution the right to hold office is
viewed as a corollary of the right to vote: "[T]he inherent powers of
government reside in the people. This is given expression in the right to
vote[] ... and the correlative right of citizens to aspire to public office and

serve therein if so chosen."

34

If the argument against limiting the right to hold office is a
129 U.S. CONST. amend. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; U.S. CONST.

amend. XXIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
13o In remarks made during floor debates on the Fifteenth Amendment in the House of
Representatives, Congressman Butler presented a sort of inverse reasoning whereby including an
explicit right to hold office in that amendment would actually have the effect of limiting the right rather
than preserving it. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1426 (1869). As he explained, an explicit right
to hold office, not to be deprived on the basis of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude," in the
Amendment would "give color to the conclusion that there are other classes which may be deprived of

the right to hold office." Id. (emphasis added). This, he said, nearly compelled him to vote against the
Amendment, because the right to hold office could only be ensured by omitting it from the text. Id "If
there was anything which was inherent as a principle in the American system and theory of government
of equality of all men before the law, and the right of all men to a share in the Government, it was this:
that the right to elect to office carries with it the inalienable and indissoluble right to be elected to
office." Id. For a fuller discussion of the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment and its implications on
voter and candidate enfranchisement, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifieenth Amendment and "Political
Rights", 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 2225 (1996).
"' Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1983).
132 CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 4. Additionally, constitutional provisions
ensuring all men be equal in rights and prescribing qualifications for electors do not mention any
explicit right to office. CONN. CONsT. art. 1, § 1; CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
133 Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 608 (1978) (emphasis added).
04 Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 298 Conn. 748, 766 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Cannon v.
Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1980)). The court's language here, though all of it quoted from a
Utah case, is strikingly similar to that of Article 1, Section 2 of the Connecticut Constitution: "All
political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and
instituted for their benefit; and they have at all times an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter their
form of government in such manner as they may think expedient." CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 2. The
Connecticut Supreme Court in 1921 took this provision to mean that "[i]t is because [government] is
their own and instituted by themselves for their own benefit that they have the right to alter it." State v.

Sinchuk, 115 A. 33, 35 (Conn. 1921). Taken together, this provision rings somewhat reminiscent of
Congressman Butler's arguments in favor of the omission of a "right to hold office" from the Fifteenth

Amendment, Amar, supra note 130, at 2227, a right perhaps strengthened by statutory silence-as in, it
is a right so fundamental to the republican form of government that it need not be expressly provided.
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constitutional one, that should not be particularly convincing. Even
conceding that there is a right to hold office on par with the right to bear
arms, there is no question that either can be limited. In D.C. v. Heller,135
the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly said that, subject to certain
considerations, limiting the right to bear arms is constitutional-"flike
most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited."l 36 Thus, as the Connecticut Supreme Court had said twenty
years earlier, "[i]t is beyond serious dispute that the legislature has the
authority to place reasonable restrictions on a citizen's right to bear
arms."I3 7

With respect to holding office, the U.S. Supreme Court has made plain
that "not all restrictions imposed by the States on candidates' eligibility for
the ballot impose constitutionally-suspect burdens on voters' rights to
associate or to choose among candidates."'
Absent discriminatory
intent,"' states' limitations on the right to hold state or local office are
outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment,' 4 0 the Fifteenth
Amendment,14 ' and federal law generally,142 including the Voting Rights
Act.1 43

In Connecticut, the constitutionality of laws imposing qualifications
for office is subject to the balancing test articulated by the U.S. Supreme

13'

554 U.S. 570 (2008).

36

' Id. at 626 (emphasis added). The Connecticut Supreme Court acknowledged the validity of this
statement in State v. DeCiccio, 315 Conn. 79, 109-10 (2014). In imposing limitations on the Second
Amendment, though, Congress must provide a rational basis to avoid due process concerns. Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980).
117 State v. Bailey, 209 Conn. 322, 346 (1988).
"'Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
139 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) ("A statute, otherwise neutral on its
face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race."); see also JOHN
MARTINEZ, 2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 10:1 (2015) ("[qt is now the law that persons cannot be
barred from holding public office or employment by criteria forbidden by the Constitution.").
" Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.412, 125-26 (1970) ("Amendment[] Fourteen ... assumed that
the States had general supervisory power over state elections. . . ."); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7

(1944) ("[A]n unlawful denial by state action of a right to state political office is not a denial of a right
of property or of liberty secured by the due process clause.").
1'
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67 (1980) ("The Court explicitly indicated in
Washington v. Davis that th[e] principle [requiring proof of intent] applies to claims of racial

discrimination affecting voting just as it does to other claims of racial discrimination.").
142 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 125 ("No function is more essential to the separate and independent
existence of the States and their governments than the power to determine within the limits of the
Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices . . . .").
143 Id. at 118 ("[T]he 18-year-old vote provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970
are constitutional and enforceable insofar as they pertain to federal elections and unconstitutional and

unenforceable insofar as they pertain to state and local elections."). But see Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d

814, 825 (2d Cir. 1995), vacated in part on reh'g en banc sub nom. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d
Cir. 1996) (noting that the Mitchell Court "said nothing to indicate that Congress would be similarly
limited if [a state] were acting to enforce the Civil War Amendments").
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44

Court in Anderson v. Celebrezze.' The legislature's power to impose
qualifications for office extends to municipal office in Connecticut as
well.1 45

Connecticut law already limits both the right to bear arms and the
"right" to hold office to varying extents. What is puzzling, though, is that
each right's statutory limitations are inversely correlated to that right's
representation in the state Constitution. The textually explicit right-to
bear arms-is limited very broadly. Nonviolent felons who could hardly be
46
described as dangerous are nonetheless barred from possessing firearms.1
But the textually absent, "correlative" right-to hold office-is hardly
limited at all. 147 Both inflict some type of injury. While the injuries
inflicted by guns are far more immediate and direct than those inflicted by
48
corruption of office, that is not to say the latter do not exist.1 So, if we are
willing to limit the black-letter right in a way so broad as to not really be
tied to its purpose in all instances, surely we should be willing to limit an
arguably nonexistent right in a way that is specifically limited to
preventing the illicit use of that right's instrument: public office. Shouldn't
we?
Those who would argue against disenfranchising the corrupt candidate
might do so by reference to the voters' right to elect the candidates of their
choice. 149 That is a legitimate argument. Indeed, "[t]he right to vote freely
" Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 284 Conn. 573, 588 (2007) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 788-89 (1983)) ("[Ijn resolving a challenge that pits a [s]tate's power to regulate its elections
against the rights secured by the [flirst [a]mendment, we cannot resort to any litmus-paper test that will
separate valid from invalid restrictions."). For a restatement of the Anderson test, see supra notes 31-

34 and accompanying text.
14 In response to an argument that the state constitution prohibits the legislature from imposing
any qualifications for office beyond the requirement in CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 4 that candidates be
electors, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut said such an interpretation was "not reasonable
nor in accordance with the law as generally received" and also that the power to impose qualifications

extended to local office. Hackett v. City of New Haven, 130 A. 121, 125 (Conn. 1925).
14 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
i CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46a(a) (2016) (returning the right to vote and office eligibility to all
felons upon completion of sentence, excluding probation).
' Infra Part [II.C.
149 Prior to announcing his bid for the Bridgeport, CT, mayor's office, Ganim made just such an

argument as quoted in an article on the bill proposed last year to effect corrupt-candidate
disenfranchisement. Jordan Fenster, Lawmakers to Consider Preventing Convicted Politiciansfrom

Running Again, CT NEWS JUNKIE (Mar. 30, 2015, 4:30 AM), http://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/archives/
entry/lawmakersto considerpreventingconvictedpoliticians from runningagain/%5Bll/15/2015
[https://perma-cc/79AT-SR8M] ("To try to pass a law to ban anybody from a second chance is wrong.
It's against the entire basis of democracy. We should let the voters decide. To take the vote away from
the public is wrong.").
A co-chairman of the General Assembly's Judiciary Committee, the body that considered the bill
last year, felt similarly: .'I'm generally inclined not to support such a concept,' said state Sen. Eric

Coleman, D-Bloomfield, co-chairman of the Legislature's Judiciary Committee ....
don't give voters enough credit ...

'Oftentimes, we

Past behavior, even things that are less than a criminal conviction, I

believe are just fair issues to be discussed in a campaign for re-election."' Lockhart, supranote 16.
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for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic
society""'o and, as "the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not
lend themselves to neat separation[,] laws that affect candidates always
have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters."'
Laws disqualifying all felons from office likely go too far, effectively
"depriv[ing] the voters of the opportunity to support the candidate of their
choice." 52 But states do have broad power to regulate elections.1 53 Where
such laws are "reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate
state objectives," they would "pass constitutional muster."l 54 The Supreme
Court in Williams v. Rhodes" held that an Ohio law was so restrictive of
third-party candidates' ability to get on the ballot that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause by "plac[ing] substantially unequal burdens on both the
right to vote and the right to associate."' 56 "[T]he right to vote is heavily
burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of two parties at a time
when other parties are clamoring for a place on the ballot."'
But the ballot restriction at issue in Williams was far more restrictive
than laws specifically prohibiting the candidacy of corrupt politicians. In
the latter case, it seems fairly uncontroversial to say that a state's interest in
maintaining the integrity of office is sufficiently compelling to justify the
resultant limitation on voters' "First Amendment freedoms," 58 particularly
in light of the limited class of would-be candidates affected. This is
supported by the overwhelming number of states that already disqualify
persons convicted of public corruption offenses from holding office. 9
Among those states, nine extend the disqualification to all felons.160 As
Steven Snyder proposes in Let My People Run, there may not be a
constitutionally sufficient justification for the curtailment of political
participation effected by the every-felon approach.1 6 ' This Note advocates
only for corrupt-candidate disenfranchisement. It is worth noting, though,
"sReynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
'' Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
1' Steven B. Snyder, Let My People Run: The Rights of Voters and Candidates Under State Laws

Barring Felonsfrom Holding Elective Office, 4 J.L. & POL. 543, 558 (1988).
'"Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968).
* Bullock 405 U.S. at 144.
.s. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
'5 Id at 31-34 ("[T]he totality of the Ohio restrictive laws taken as a whole imposes a burden on
voting and associational rights which we hold is an invidious discrimination, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.").
' Id. at 31.
1.58Id.
159 See Appendix, Parts B, C. A total of thirty-four states impose some measure of disqualification
from office on felons after they have completed their sentence. The specific approaches taken by each

state belie any uniformity beyond this general function. Each state's approach is described in turn in the

Appendix.
"oSee Appendix, Part C.
161 Snyder, supranote 152, at 545.

1
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that the every-felon approach is alive and well. Just last year, Arkansas
extended the provision of its constitution concerning office eligibility to
include all felons and some misdemeanants.' 62
Connecticut is in a one-third minority of states that do not take either
of these approaches.' 63 One reason these states do not take such an
approach is likely a preference simply to let the voters decide," the idea
that "[d]emocracy legitimizes governance by introducing systematic
accountability."i6 s But this overlooks the fundamental idea of corruptcandidate disenfranchisement.
Our electoral process demands an incredible amount of trust from
voters. It asks them to place that trust in peers who do nothing more than
promise to serve the public's interests. Once convicted, corrupt politicians
should lose this immense privilege-not by virtue of their offense per se,
but by virtue of the underlying violation of the public trust. To leave this
question-to trust or not to trust-for the polls is to put the gun back in the
shooter's hand. By the time the voters reach the polls it is too late. The
corrupt politician's advantage has been taken, the public has been duped.
That is why a categorical prohibition on corrupt politicians' candidacies is
the vehicle for safeguarding public office.
To put it in literary terms, there is a certain "willing suspension of
disbelief"' in democracy. Our electoral system requires a certain
indulgence on the part of voters; it "requires the acceptance of fictions,
requires the willing suspension of disbelief, requires us to believe that the
emperor is clothed even though we can see that he is not."1 67 Some go so
far as to count lies among the "tools in the arsenal of political action" and

162 ARK. CONST. art. V, § 9. This provision had always disqualified candidates convicted of
"embezzlement of public money, bribery, forgery or other infamous crime." Id A 2015 amendment

added a definition of "infamous crime" to that provision so that it now expressly incorporates all

felonies. 2015 Arkansas Laws Act 1027 ("As used in this section, 'infamous crime' means: (1) A
felony offense . . . (4) A misdemeanor offense in which the finder of fact was required to find, or the
defendant to admit, an act of deceit. . . .").
163 See Appendix, Part A. A total of sixteen states do not disqualify any felons from holding office
once their sentences have been completed.
6

A co-chairman of the Connecticut General Assembly's Judiciary Committee cited this in

voicing his disinclination to pass such a law last year. Lockhart, supra note 16.
6 Kimon Valaskakis, The Perilsof "Dumb" Democracy, 13 WIDENER L. REv. 295, 308 (2007).
i" Michael Tomko, Politics, Performance, and Coleridge's "Suspension of Disbelief', 49
VicToRIAN STUD. 241, 241 (2007). The term was coined by Samuel Taylor Coleridge and has been
explained as the practice of fiction readers "suspend[ing] [their] disbelief so as to go along in
imagination with express judgments and doctrines from which he would ordinarily dissent.]" Id. at
242.
167 Richard R. Beeman, Self-Evident Fictions:Divine Right, PopularSovereignty, and the Myth of

the Constituent Power in the Anglo-American World, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1569, 1569-70 (1989)
(reviewing EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988)) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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It seems reasonable-if a touch cynical-to concede that citizens will
stomach some measure of sophistry before they start to reconsider their
support of a candidate. Perhaps this patience for outsize pronouncements is
conscious, perhaps not. Put another way, as then-candidate Abraham
Lincoln supposedly said in response to what he perceived as sophistry on
the part of Stephen Douglas, "[y]ou can fool all the people some of the
time, you can fool some of the people all the time, but you can't fool all the
people all the time."'
Political scientists have observed something similar to this concept.
"Discounting Theory" holds that when politicians take extreme positions
they win the support of voters not because voters believe a candidate will
accomplish everything they promise, but because the "discounted" version
of the candidate's platforn-what they may realistically accomplish-is
still enough to satisfy the voters' interests.i'e At least in the context of
Congressional elections, the voter "knows that no [candidate] will be able
to do everything it says it will do.... [The voter] must estimate in his own
mind what the [candidates] would actually do if they were in power."71
As it concerns corrupt-candidate disenfranchisement, the point is this:
candidates are afforded a certain level of willfully ignorant faith from the
electorate. Voters may not believe every word said by someone running for
office, but they believe enough of the campaign rhetoric to support them.
Politicians who have been convicted of an offense against the public trust
should not be entitled to this faith. These individuals reveal themselves to
be "politicians" in the worst sense of the word: "schemer[s] or plotter[s],"
"self-interested manipulator[s]."' 72 Once so revealed, corrupt politicians
should be prevented from again possessing the pulpits they have used to
manipulate the public rather than serve its interests. In the same way that a
violent offense vitiates our faith that a person will only use firearms for
lawful purposes, a public-corruption offense should vitiate our faith that a
'" Hannah Arendt, Reflections: Truth andPolitics, NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 1967, at 49.

16' Thomas E. Schwartz, "You Can Fool All of the People": Lincoln Never Said That, FOR THE

PEOPLE (Abraham Lincoln Ass'n, Springfield, 111.), 2003, at 6.
170 See James Adams et al., Representation in Congressional
Campaigns: Evidence for
Discounting/DirectionalVoting in US. Senate Elections, 66 J. POL. 348, 349 (2004) (describing studies

"explor[ing] the possibility that voters evaluate the candidates not according to their actual policy
declarations but according to the voters' projections of the policies that elected candidates could

successfully implement, where these projected policies are typically discounted versions of the
candidates' proposals").
"' Id The "suspended disbelief' in the context of the Adams article does not concern voters'
judgment of a candidate's veracity per se. Rather, the study focused exclusively on elections for seats
in the U.S. Senate, "where candidates can be expected only modestly to influence government

policies." Id at 350. Specifically, the study analyzed data on the 1988, 1990, and 1992 Senate
elections. Id
72 Politician,OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006).
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politician will only use office to serve the public's interests and not their
own. We have laws observing the former. We need laws observing the
latter.
B. The Impeachment Contradiction
Another reason why Connecticut should expressly disqualify persons
convicted of public corruption offenses from again holding office can be
stated simply, if obtusely: We kind of already do. Connecticut is one of
thirteen states that permanently disqualify one from office following
impeachment but do not permanently disqualify one from office following
a criminal conviction of public corruption offenses. 173
With respect to "the governor[] and all other executive and judicial
officers" in Connecticut, if one is impeached they are both removed from
office and disqualified from holding "any office of honor, trust or profit
under the state."1 74 But if one is convicted in a criminal court of an
impeachable offense, the disqualification only extends through the duration
of his or her sentence.1 75 On its face, this presents a pretty glaring
contradiction: if a governor is tried and convicted of bribery in Hartford
Superior Court, he can seek and hold office once his sentence is completed.
But if said governor is called to task for his crimes in a different room just
a few hundred feet away-the state Senate chamber-and is impeached, he
may never again hold office.
This hypothetical should sound familiar to Connecticut residents. This
is exactly the loophole through which then-Governor John Rowland
slipped when he resigned from office in 2004. In the months following Joe
Ganim's 2003 conviction, revelations of Governor Rowland's own
improprieties consumed the state.1 76 In January 2004, the state House of
Representatives convened a Committee of Inquiry to investigate
Rowland's misconduct in office.' 7 7 The testimony there made clear that
Rowland had given about as much thought to subtlety as Ganim had: state
contractors paid for the installation of a $14,000 kitchen, cathedral ceiling,
" These states are Connecticut, Arizona, Hawaii, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Vermont. For a discussion of each state's

particular laws on office eligibility and impeachment, see Appendix, Part A.
Limiting the discussion here to Connecticut, the state's impeachment provision does not

enumerate qualifying offenses. CONN. CONST. art. IX, § 3. The near-impeachment of John Rowland,
who faced accusations including receiving gifts from contractors prior to a federal conviction on related
charges, would indicate such offenses suffice for impeachment purposes. Cowan, supranote 17.
74

CONN. CONST. art. IX,

' CONN. GEN. STAT.
76

See Michael

§§

§ 3.
9-46, 9-46a (2015).

Powell, Connecticut Governor Resigns, WASH.

POST (June 22, 2004),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/arficles/A57561-2004Jun21.html
[https://perma.ce/3YBZYV26] (reporting Rowland's June 21, 2004 resignation).
" Office of Govemor v. Select Comm. of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 545 (2004).
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and a $3,600 hot tub at Rowland's lakeside summer cottage and bought
him "thousands of dollars' worth of champagne, Cuban cigars and a
Mustang convertible."' The politics of the situation were equally
unmasked: "State leaders in both political parties acknowledged that a
consensus was building for an impeachment vote."' 79
When the Committee of Inquiry subpoenaed Rowland to testify, he
sought an injunction on the basis of immunity under the Connecticut
Constitution's separation of powers provision.so Denied by the trial court,
Rowland's appeal was expedited to the state Supreme Court.' 8 ' In a
decision issued on Friday, June 18, 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court.1 8 2 Rowland would have to testify.
Saturday, Sunday, Monday: standing beside his wife on the patio of the
governor's residence, Rowland gave a five-minute speech before reporters
and resigned from office.' 8 ' Because of this maneuver, even though
Rowland later pleaded guilty to various federal offenses related to his time
as governor'" and has now again been sentenced to prison for offenses
related to electoral improprieties,18 1 there will be no legal barricade
between him and the ballot once he completes his current sentence. 86
Why is that? What is it about the impeachment process that warrants
this additional consequence? What is it about the criminal justice system
that precludes a conviction from having the same effect?
The two Connecticut Supreme Court cases that have addressed the
state's impeachment process do not answer these questions."' The history
of the Connecticut Constitution is no help either. Article IX was not the
subject of any (recorded) debate at the Connecticut Constitutional
Convention of 1818. The convention's journal provides only that "[t]he

" Powell, supra note 176.
'7' Id
'n Office ofGovernor, 271 Conn. at 543-44.

'8 Id at 546-47.
182 1d at 544-45.
183 Powell, supra note 176.
8 See Cowan, supra note 17 (stating that Rowland, several months after his resignation, pleaded
guilty to conspiring to commit tax fraud).
'

Edmund H. Mahony, Ex-Governor John Rowland Sentenced to 30 Months in Prison,

HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-john-rowlandsentenced-20150318-story.html [https://permacc/9SSH-KKFT] (reporting Rowland's conviction of
election law violations).
" Rowland's sentence of two and a half years in prison followed by three years of probation was
scheduled to begin in June 2015. Id. This would have rendered him eligible for office at about the start
of 2021. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46a (2016). Rowland has since appealed this conviction and the
District Court granted him bail pending appeal. Brief for Appellant at 23, United States v. Rowland,
No. 15-00985 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2015).
"7 These cases are Kinsella v. Jaekle, 192 Conn. 704 (1984) and Office of Governor v. Select
Comm. of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540 (2004).
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Ninth Article, Of Impeachments, was read and approved."'" The
convention's debates were not transcribed, though in 1991 Attorney
Wesley W. Horton sought to build a makeshift record by compiling
newspaper accounts of the convention. Unfortunately, his quite successful
effort was of no avail on the impeachment question. The reporter covering
the convention had gone home sick during an afternoon recess and did not
return for the evening session in which Article IX was approved.' The
Connecticut Constitutional Convention of 1965 approved an identical
version of Article IX without any discussion.' 90
What to do without instructive state jurisprudence? Find a federal
analogue. The Connecticut Supreme Court took this approach in its first
impeachment case, Kinsella v. Jaekle,' 9' where the court looked to the
origins of the U.S. Constitution's impeachment provisions for guidance.' 9 2
Fearful of the monarchical tendencies of a strong executive, the
colonists incorporated impeachment power into the U.S. Constitution to
prevent the executive from usurping "the powers that the people had
reserved to themselves or vested with the legislature, the branch most
immediately responsive to their wishes."l 93 States adopting their own
impeachment procedures took after the federal example. 94 Connecticut's
impeachment provisions differ from the federal government's only in that
they do not enumerate which offenses may give rise to impeachment.' 9 5
"Thus," the Kinsella court said, "the Connecticut [C]onstitutions
impeachment and removal provisions[] . . . may be understood in light of
those federal provisions and the intent of the founding fathers in adopting
them."

96

And the founding fathers had politics in mind. Alexander Hamilton
described impeachment as a political endeavor undertaken by politicians to
call other politicians to task for political misdeeds-"offenses which
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the
'" Journal of the Constitutional Convention of Connecticut, Held at Hartford, in 1818 (1873)

(available at the Connecticut State Library, subsequent printing
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id-uc2.ark:/13960/tl8k7bhOx;view-lup;seq-9
-8P7H]).

available online at
[https://perma.cc/9392

189 Wesley W. Horton, Annotated Debates of the 1818 ConstitutionalConvention, 65 CONN. BAR

J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) SI-1, SI-74 nn.86-87, SI-75 (1991).
'" WESLEY W. HORTON, THE CONNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 149-

50 (1993).
'" 192 Conn. 704 (1984).
112 Id. at 717-18.
'19 Id at 719 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1,

§§

2, 3; U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 4).

'94 Id at 720. Actually, this alone may explain why disqualification accompanies impeachment

but not conviction. One impetus for the federal impeachment provisions was the inability to criminally
prosecute a sitting president Amar, supra note 130, at 292. State officials do not enjoy the same
immunity and thus can be convicted or impeached, either ofwhich ought to effect disqualification.
'9 Kinsella, 192 Conn. at 720 n.14.
191 Id at 720.

1376

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1347

97

abuse or violation of some public trust."l The political nature of
impeachment and the partiality it inspires presents "the greatest danger that
the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties,
than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt."' Faced with these
realities, Hamilton felt the best arbiter of impeachments would not be the
courts but the Senate, a body that could "preserve, unawed and
uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an INDIVIDUAL
accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, HIS
ACCUSERS[.]"'9
Hamilton found the Supreme Court inferior in this for two reasons: its
members might lack "so eminent a portion of fortitude" to execute "so
difficult a task" and its decision might lack the necessary "credit and
authority" to "reconcil[e] the people to a decision that should happen to
clash with an accusation brought by their immediate representatives." 200
Fundamentally, though, Hamilton favored the Senate in this for its size, a
superior safeguard against error than criminal procedure would be:
This can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in
the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors, or in the
construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to
limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal security.
There will be no jury to stand between the judges who are to
pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party who is to
receive or suffer it. The awful discretion which a court of
impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to
infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished
characters of the community, forbids the commitment of the
trust to a small number of persons. 201
Ultimately, then, Hamilton favored the Senate because one, it would be
less partial than judges, and two, because a task so monumental could not
be entrusted to just a few people in robes. The need for such safeguards, of
course, arises from the likelihood that "the decision will be regulated more
by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of
innocence or guilt."
With these considerations in mind, Congress-or, in the state context,
state legislatures-seems a strange choice. Today, "impartial" and "nonpartisan" are likely among the last words most would choose to describe
legislators. And, for lack of determinate law on a process as infrequently
' THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
198Id.
1

9Id.

Id.
201 Id
200
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undertaken as impeachment, "one inevitably finds some other factornamely politics, broadly defined-determining outcomes."202
This Note ultimately is not concerned with choosing the right body to
conduct impeachments. The question here is why disqualification from
office follows impeachment, but not conviction.
One argument in favor of limiting disqualification to impeached
officials could be to let the people decide (through their representatives) if
an official should be impeached and thus disqualified from office. As
Hamilton noted, entrusting courts with impeachment puts a big question in
the hands of just a few people. 203 If disqualification followed from a
criminal conviction-which is to say, a decision made by at most twelve
jurors with the guidance of a judge and the competing arguments of
counsel-one could argue that not enough of the people have spoken as to
whether or not the accused ought to hold office again. In the impeachment
setting, though, it is the legislature, the "branch most immediately
responsive to [the people's] wishes,"2 04 making that determination.
In the latter case, disqualification could be justified in terms of
efficiency-there's no need to have voters go out to the polls in a
subsequent election to tell an impeached official they don't want them in
office, they already told them so by and through their legislators in the
impeachment setting.
Perhaps the best argument for limiting disqualification to the
impeachment setting over criminal courts is simple political accountability.
202 Michael J. Klarman, Essay, ConstitutionalFetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85

VA. L. REv. 631, 651 (1999). The likelihood that politics and not law will determine outcomes in
impeachments is also used to justify the legislature's role as the impeaching body. The reasoning goes
that impeachment does not concern definite offenses fit for judicial review, it concerns complicated
questions of "fitness for office" that are inherently prudential in nature.

John 0. McGinnis,

Impeachment: The Structural Understanding, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 650, 650 (1999). Thus, such
questions must go to legislatures, "the repositor[ies] of prudential judgment." Id
This notion arose in Connecticut in Office of Governor v. Select Comm. of Inquiry, though the
question there was not what body should impeach but whether a court could rule on the legitimacy of a
subpoena issued against the governor in proceedings preliminary to impeachment. 271 Conn. 540, 576
(2004). The Connecticut Supreme Court ultimately rejected the select committee's argument that the
issue presented a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 573-74. In doing so, the Court noted that
"simply because the case has a connection to the political sphere [is not] an independent basis for
characterizing an issue as a political question." Id. at 573.
In a dissenting opinion calling upon the framers' conception of impeachment as "inherently

political in nature and hence committed to the complete discretion of the most political branch, the
legislature[,]" Justice Zarella argued that the question was indeed political and so nonjusticiable. Id. at
603, 608 (Zarella, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "When the
constitution clearly commits a function to the legislative branch, [w]e must resist the temptation . . . to
enhance our own constitutional authority by trespassing upon an area clearly reserved as the
prerogative of a coordinate branch of government . . .. The majority has succumbed to that temptation
in the present case . . . [and] eviscerate[d] the political question doctrine[.]" Id. at 603-04.
203 THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
2

Kinsella v. Jaekle, 192 Conn. 704, 720 (1984).
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Federal or state prosecutors who fail to bring charges against an official
will not be voted out of a job come November.2 05 Legislators who fail to
move for impeachment of a corrupt governor "will pay at election time,"206
and so it behooves them to impeach and, in so doing, disqualify from
office those officials the public would like to see ousted.
But there are two imperfections with this approach. First, there is the
issue of partisanship in politics. Though Hamilton viewed the Senate as
less partial than courts, that feels somewhat less certain today. Second,
there is the confounding experience of the Clinton impeachment, during
which some argued against Congress acting in response to public
opinion-i.e., the people-and instead thought Congress should simply
rely on the law, never mind the relative lack of law in the impeachment
context. 207

Additionally, there is the Kinsella court's characterization of
impeachment-and, by extension, disqualification from office-as a
means of protecting the state rather than punishing the offender.2 08 There,
the court relied on the Texas Supreme Court's 1924 decision in Ferguson
v. Maddox.2 0 The Ferguson court said that to the extent an impeached
party suffers, that is only an "incident[] of a remedy necessary for the
public protection." 210 This appears to put the gravity of a criminal
conviction above that of an impeachment. If an impeachment is meant to
protect the public by removing "unfaithful official[s]" and deny them an
opportunity to "sin against [the people] a second time,"211 then so should a
criminal conviction. Such a law would not be "penal in nature," as Judge
Kinney viewed Connecticut's limited candidate eligibility provisions in
Sweeney, 2 12 it would simply be a procedural nuance to ballot access meant
to protect the public.
The Ferguson court's discussion of this point is particularly relevant to
the Rowland story. In Ferguson, an impeached governor challenged the
disqualifying effect of the action, in part, on the grounds that he resigned
from office before the impeachment became final. The court found this
205
20

6

207

Amar, supranote 130, at 294.
d
In a letter to the House Judiciary Committee published in the Wall Street Journal, "[ninety-six]

scholars, lawyers, and former government officials argued, in part, that '[i]f we would not allow polls

to silence unpopular speech, neither must we allow polls to excuse and ratify impeachable offenses[.]"'
Klarman, supra note 202, at 653 n.83 (citing Editorial, Don't Let the President Lie with Impunity,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1998, at A22). "In fulfilling their constitutional duties, neither the courts nor
Congress should be deflected by public opinion polls," the letter said. Don't Let the PresidentLie with
Impunity, supra.
211
209
2 10

211
212

Kinsella, 192 Conn. at 721 (citing Ferguson v. Maddox, 114 Tex. 85, 98 (1924)).
Ferguson v. Maddox, 114 Tex. 85 (1924).

Id. at 98.

Id. at 99.
Supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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argument unavailing: "[t]he purpose of the constitutional provision may
not be thwarted by an eleventh-hour resignation." 2 13 Though that case
concerned a completed impeachment, state officials who, like Rowland,
resign earlier in the proceedings only to be convicted criminally should not
be permitted to dodge the disqualifying bullet either. If the purpose of
disqualifying impeached officials is to keep out of office "[d]emagogues"
who, despite impeachment, "might be popular because they [tell] the
people what they want[] to hear," 2 14 then the same protection should attend
a criminal conviction of offenses for which one could also have been
impeached.
Finally, if the divergence in consequences for impeached versus
convicted corrupt politicians does not appear contradictory, look to
Connecticut's law on corrupt politicians' disqualification from working as
registered lobbyists. Under Connecticut General Statutes § 1-101a, no
public official or state employee who is convicted or pleads guilty or nolo
contendere to a "crime related to state or quasi-public agency office," can
seek or accept employment as a lobbyist. 2 15 Those crimes are defined as
embezzling state funds, theft, bribery, and receiving a bribe 2 16 -the corrupt
politician's greatest hits collection.
Section 1-101a came into effect in 2005, two years after the Ganim
conviction and one year after Rowland's guilty plea. 2 17 The obvious
motivation for the law would be to keep the demonstrably corrupt out of
lobbying, an arena in which they could ply their illicit trade to the
detriment of the public. But Connecticut does not have any laws
disqualifying corrupt politicians from office. So, are we to understand that
the legislature does not believe such a threat exists when corrupt politicians
are entrusted to serve the public's interest in elected office?
C. Public Corruption'sEffect on Local Economies Highlights the Damage
These Laws Would Mitigate
Finally, legislatures should prevent corrupt politicians from repeating
their offenses for the same reason they seek to prevent the repetition of any
crime. Crimes result in harm. Here, the harm is to the economies of
affected locales.
Look at Bridgeport. The "comeback" storyline defined Ganim's 2015
mayoral campaign. "Everybody loves a comeback story," one supporter

213 Ferguson, 114 Tex. at 99.

McGinnis, supra note 202, at 660.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-101a (2015).
216
Id. § 1-101a(a)(1).
217 An Act Concerning Government Administration, P.A. No. 05-287, 2005 Conn. Legis. Serv.
P.A. 05-287 (S.S.B. 96) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-84b(a)).
214
215

1380

CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1347

2 18

said,
a refrain that grew common over the course of the 2015 election
season.2 19 "Some will call this a comeback story. For me it is a city that I
never left," Ganim said following his election in November. 220 in one
published statement, a Ganim supporter took the second-chance narrative a
step further, justifying Ganim's comeback on the idea that his crimes
"didn't hurt anybody but himself." 221
"He was just one of the ones that got caught," said the sixty-year
Bridgeport resident after casting her vote for Ganim in the Democratic
primary election, which Ganim won. "He didn't take anything from
me .... He was just getting kickbacks, getting work done for other favors.
So he didn't do it to us. He just stepped out of bounds, you know, that's
all." 22 2

No, that's not all. Ganim's crimes did not only result in his receipt of
hundreds of thousands of dollars in "cash, diamonds, expensive wine,
tailored clothing, high-priced meals, and home renovations," 2 23 his crimes
cast a cloud of corruption over the city, chilling economic development
and providing anecdotal evidence for an unflattering reputation with which
the city has long been saddled.
Contrary to the comment made by the Ganim voter, this is where
public corruption offenses do hurt more than the offender-they indirectly
injure every resident of municipalities and states who would have
benefitted from job growth and economic expansion created by developers
who pass over locales regarded as corrupt. 2 24 In fact, "[c]orruption is
generally regarded as one of the most serious obstacles to development." 22 5
This has been documented by economists. "Most theoretical and empirical
evidence shows that public officials' corruption has a negative impact on
national economic variables . . . . [C]orruption reduces the amount of
capital investment." 2 26 Construction project kickback schemes in particular
218

Michael P. Mayko, Showtime for Ganim-Finch Summer Blockbuster,
CONN. POST (July 18,

2015), http://www.ctpost.com/news/article/Showtime-for-Ganim-Finch-summer-blockbuster-6391486
.php [https://perma.cc/M3BY-GJNZ].
219 Keating & Hladky, supra note 7 ("Time and again, Ganim's supporters said that he deserved a
second chance.").
220 d
221 Kristin Hussey, Bridgeport Mayor Vows to 'Fight
Like Heck' After Losing Primary Election,
N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/nyregion/mayor-of-bridgeportvows-to-fight-like-heck-after-losing-primary-election.html?_r0 [https://perma.cc/2Q3Y-GALY].
222 Id.
223 Keating & Hladky, supra note 7.
224 See Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 QUART. J. ECON. 681, 681 (1995)
("Many
economists argue that malfunctioning government institutions constitute a severe obstacle to

investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation.").
225 Daniel Lederman et al., Accountabilityand Corruption:PoliticalInstitutions Matter, 17 EcoN.

& POL. 1, 1 (2005).
226 Cheol Liu & John L. Mikesell, The Impact of Public Oficials' Corruption on the Size and
Allocation of US. State Spending, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 346, 347 (2014).
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have a "statistically significant" impact on per capita state construction
expenditures in states with higher levels of corruption.227 Such states also
tend to have lower expenditures on public welfare, health, and hospitals. 2 28
Evidence of specific instances of this phenomenon is largely limited to
the anecdotal, but observations of it have been made in Connecticut. In his
comments to the state legislature's judiciary committee in support of a
corrupt-candidate disenfranchisement bill proposed last year, the then-head
of the Bridgeport Regional Business Council noted the deleterious effect of
the state's "'Corrupticut' perception" 22 9 on its economy:
[O]ne reason why our state has not advanced quickly enough
in terms of job growth and economic expansion[] is because
potential investors, developers, and business leaders, in
general, lack sufficient confidence in the State of
Connecticut. They lack that confidence for a number of
reasons; not the least of which are the troubles we have had
over the last five to ten years in terms of corrupt politicians.
Far too many of our elected officials have ended up as
convicted felons. This state of things has, in our opinion,
resulted in a lack of investor confidence. Investors,
developers and business leaders like political stability, they
like political ability, and they like above board dealings with
political decision makers. To have an environment where so
many of our elected officials, frankly, have ended up in jail
over the last ten years, or so, has helped to diminish
confidence in our state.230
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH FOR CORRUPT-CANDIDATE
DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN CONNECTICUT

In light of the foregoing, Connecticut should adopt an approach to
candidate disenfranchisement that permanently disqualifies officials who
have been convicted of offenses involving a breach of the public trust.
With respect to persons not holding office when convicted of offenses
involving corruption of another's office, an additional ten-year
disqualification from office should trigger at the conclusion of their
sentence.
This approach differs only slightly from the legislation proposed in

2 27

Id at 353.
d at 354.
229 See Testimony from Paul S. Timpanelli, President and CEO of Bridgeport Regional Business
Council, and Joseph McGee, Vice President of the Business Council of Fairfield County, to Judiciary
Committee of the General Assembly (Apr. 1, 2015) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
228

1

2o

Id

I [Vol. 48:1347
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Connecticut last year. Had the legislature passed the bill, officials and
candidates who have committed public corruption offenses would be
permanently disqualified from office.231
The approach proposed here would only add the ten-year
disqualification for private individuals following the completion of any
sentence imposed for public corruption offenses. These individuals should
not be permanently disqualified due to the possibility that their offenses
were borne of something close to necessity. Sitting officials or running
candidates who commit public corruption offenses unequivocally reveal
themselves to be undeserving of the trust inherent in public office. But
those individuals who offer or give bribes to officials may do so for lack of
alternative options in obtaining government contracts in cities and states
where "pay-to-play" is the order of the day. Still, the buffer period between
sentence completion and restored eligibility would ideally outlast an
individual's connections in the pay-to-play arena and thus mitigate the risk
of their corrupting the office sought.
This approach is sufficiently limited to pass constitutional muster
under the test set forth in Anderson.232 Here, the state's interest is in
safeguarding the integrity of public office by screening out those who
would compromise it. The injury is limited to disqualified candidates who
commit a specific type of offense, as opposed to a sweeping
disqualification of all felons. If states are to safeguard the integrity of
public office and the economic viability of both the state and its
municipalities, such an approach is necessary. As the approach would not
condition disqualification on anything other than the type of offense for
which one is convicted and whether the offender held office at the time of
the offense, it would not have a discriminatory impact on any social
demographic. This scheme would "advance[] the compelling interest for
honesty, integrity and confidence of the public in government, which is
greater than the convicted person's interest in the office."233
Like similar provisions in states that already take the corrupt-candidate
disenfranchisement approach, this would "essentially be a character
provision."234 This provision, like those of other states, would not be
intended as a punishment, though undoubtedly persons affected would
view it this way. Rather, the provision would be an acknowledgement by
the state that "conviction of an infamous crime .

.

. is irreversible evidence

that the offender does not possess the requisite character for public
Raised Bill No. 7052, 2015 Gen. Assemb. Judiciary Comm., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015).
Supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
Lubin v. Wilson, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1422, 1429 (1991). The Lubin court did not cite Anderson
in its analysis of a provision disqualifying persons from office pending appeal of a felony conviction,
though the factors considered mirror those articulated in Anderson. See Heitz, supra note 108, at 643.
234 State ex rel Wier v. Peterson, 369 A.2d 1076, 1080-81 (Del. 1976).
231

232
233
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office." 235

To be sure, this is a "demanding norm." 23 6 But it is a norm demanded
by the nature of public office and the trust the public invests in those who
hold it. To borrow the words of a supporter of the bill proposed last year,
"[t]he public trust is something that is incredibly important, not just to the
integrity of the system but to our viability as a democracy."237
APPENDIX: STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY OF APPROACHES
TO PUBLIC CORRUPTION OFFENSE CONVICTIONS AND
DISQUALIFICATION FROM OFFICE

There is hardly uniformity amongst states' approaches to candidate
disenfranchisement, but each state's approach tends to fall into one of three
general categories: states that lack any laws specifically disenfranchising
candidates who have been convicted of public corruption offenses; states
that take a particularized approach, disenfranchising only those candidates
who have been convicted of such offenses; and states that simply
disenfranchise any candidate with a felony conviction.
Below are descriptions of each state's approach to candidate
disenfranchisement. The states are organized first by category and then
alphabetically within each category. A handful of states that have
approaches combining elements of more than one category are reflected
below with an asterisk.
A.

States that Lack Laws Specifically Disenfranchising Candidates
PreviouslyConvicted of Bribery or Like Offenses
1. Alaska

Alaska requires that one seeking candidacy in a primary election
"execute and file a declaration of candidacy" which includes a declaration
that "the candidate is a qualified voter as required by law." 238 Following
conviction for a "felony involving moral turpitude," one may only regain
status as a qualified voter upon their "unconditional discharge." 23 9 Felonies
involving moral turpitude are defined as "those crimes that are immoral or
wrong in themselves" and include various violent and sexual offenses as
well as bribery and receiving a bribe. 24 0 A person is unconditionally
discharged once they are "released from all disability arising under a
5

id.
Id.
237 Fenster, supra note 149 (quoting Connecticut State Sen. William Tong, co-chairman
of the
General Assembly Judiciary Committee).
238 ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.030 (2016).
23
23

236

9

2

Id

4 ALASKA STAT.

§ 15.80.010 (2016).
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24

sentence, including probation and parole," ' at which point they regain
their right to vote and the eligibility for office. 24 2

Alaska statutes prohibiting bribery, receiving a bribe, and failing to
report bribery do not include provisions extending candidate
disenfranchisement beyond that which follows all felonies.243 Moreover,
even officials impeached from office are spared any extension of their
disqualification from office. 2" Yet, Alaska law does provide for the
revocation of an official's state pension upon their conviction of certain
offenses related to public corruption, including bribery and perjury.245
2. Arizona
Convicted felons cannot vote in Arizona. 24 In order to hold office, one
must first be a qualified elector.2 47 As such, Arizona disqualifies all felons
from holding office until their civil rights are restored, the process for
which varies based on the number of felony convictions. 24s Civil rights are
automatically restored to first-time offenders upon completion of sentence
and payment of any fines.249 If convicted of two or more felonies, one can
petition to the sentencing court for the restoration of that person's civil
rights two years after their discharge from prison or after their discharge
from parole.250
Arizona's bribery statute does not contain any additional restrictions
on eligibility for office beyond those triggered by the offense's felony
classification. 251 Yet, among the offenses which subject a state official to
impeachment is "malfeasance in office." 25 2 One so impeached-regardless
of their status as a felon or non-felon-would be removed from office and
forever disqualified from holding office.253
3. Connecticut
Persons convicted of a felony and committed to a correctional
institution forfeit their right to vote and the privileges that right entails. 2 5 4
Such persons become eligible to hold office again once they complete their
241
242
24 3

ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.185(18) (2016).
ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.030 (2016).
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.100, 11.56.110, 11.56.124 (2016).

ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 20 ("The judgment may not extend beyond removal from office[.]").
ALASKA STAT. § 37.10.310 (2016).
24
ARIZ. CONST. art. Vil, § 2.
247 ARiz. CONST. art. VIl, §
15.
244
245

REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-904, 13-905 (West 2016).
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-912 (West 2016).
250 ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-905(A), 13-906
(West 2016).
251 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2602 (West
2016).
2" ARIZ.
249

252 ARIZ. CONST. art. 8, pt 2,
25 3

21

d
CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 2.

§ 9-46 (2016).
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prison sentence and any period of parole.255 Connecticut's statutes
prohibiting bribery involving a public official do not contain any
provisions for additional candidate disenfranchisement.25 6 However, an
official convicted of an offense related to "state or quasi-public agency
office" may not later work as a registered lobbyist. 257 Additionally, state
officials and employees convicted of offenses related to state or municipal
office are subject to possible reduction or revocation of their pension
benefits.25 8
If a state official is impeached from office, though, they are
permanently disqualified from again holding office under the state
constitution. 259

4. Florida
Florida disqualifies all felons from voting and holding office until their
civil rights have been restored. 2 60 To have civil rights restored, one must
petition the state Board of Executive Clemency.261 The ultimate decisionkis
the governor's. 262

While a public official convicted of certain offenses forfeits his or her
public retirement benefits, 263 there is no lifetime disqualification for
holding office specific to corrupt officials as prescribed by statute. 2 64 But,
if a public official is impeached, the state senate may, in its discretion,
permanently disqualify the impeached official from ever again holding
office. 26 5
5. Hawaii
For purposes of candidate disenfranchisement, Hawaii treats all
felonies the same, only disqualifying felons from holding office for the
duration of his or her incarceration. 2 ' A public official convicted of a
felony forfeits office upon conviction. 26 7 Hawaii's bribery statute does not
contain any provision for candidate disenfranchisement specific to that

255

Id.

CONN. GEN. STAT.
CONN. GEN. STAT.
258
CONN. GEN. STAT.
256
257

259

§§ 53a-147, 53a-148 (2016).
§ 1-101a (2016).
§ 1-1Oa (2016).

CONN. CONST. art. IX,

§ 3.

260

FLA. CONST. art. VI,
261 FLA. CONST. art. IV,

§ 4;
§ 8;

262 FLA. CONST. art. IV,

§ 8.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§ 97.041 (2016).
§ 940.05 (2016).

FLA. STAT. § 112.3173(3) (2016).
264 See FLA. STAT. § 838.015 (2016) (bribery statute lacks any provision relating to candidate
disenfranchisement).
265 FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17.
266 HAW. REV. STAT. § 831-2 (2016).
267 Id
263
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268

offense.
If a state official is impeached, though, they are then forever
disqualified from holding office.269

6. Idaho
Upon conviction of a felony, one forfeits his or her right to vote and
his or her eligibility to hold office until their civil rights have been
restored, which generally occurs upon completion of their sentence.270
While conviction of public corruption offenses by a sitting official would
forfeit their office, it would have no greater effect on their future eligibility
to hold office.271 But, if a sitting official is impeached, they are forever

disqualified from holding office. 2 72
7. Illinois
Illinois' Constitution disqualifies from holding office any person
convicted of "a felony, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime" but also
allows that "[e]ligibility may be restored as provided by law." 2 73 The
state's legislature did just that, providing that persons convicted of any
felony are only ineligible to hold office until the completion of their
sentence. 27 4 However, the state may refuse to restore the right to hold
office if "the authority having jurisdiction of such license rights finds after
investigation and hearing that restoration is not in the public interest." 275 A
sitting official convicted of official misconduct forfeits their office. 276 An
impeached official is forever disqualified from holding office.27 7
8. Maine
Maine requires candidates seeking office to be registered to vote in the
locality they seek to represent,27 8 but does not suspend the voting rights of
convicted felons, allowing incarcerated persons to both vote andtheoretically, at least-run for office.279 What is confusing, though, is that
sentencing judges have the power to remove convicted persons from
office. 28 0
268 HAW. REv. STAT.

§ 710-1040 (2016).
269 IAW. CONST. art. 3, § 19.
270 IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3; IDAHO CODE
271 IDAHO CODE § 18-1360 (2016).
272 IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 3.
277 ILL. CONST. art. 13, §
1.
274 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-5
(2016).
275

§ 18-310

(2016).

Id.

720 ILL. COME. STAT. 5/33-3(c) (2016).
§ 14.
278 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 333
(2016).
279 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 112(14) (2016); see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
21-A,
(lacking any consideration of incarceration's effect on candidate eligibility).
280 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1152(4) (2016).
276

277 ILL CONST. art. 4,

§ 333
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While Maine's bribery statute does not include any provision for
candidate disenfranchisement, 281 an impeached state official is forever
disqualified from holding office.282
9. New Hampshire
A person convicted of a felony in New Hampshire loses their right to
vote during their incarceration, is barred from holding office until their full
sentence has been completed, and, if in office at the time of the conviction,
forfeits their office.283
New Hampshire's bribery statute does not contain any provision for
additional candidate disenfranchisement specific to that offense. 28 If a
sitting official is impeached-one offense exposing officials to
impeachment being bribery-they are permanently disqualified from
holding office.2 85 In cases of a conviction for bribery or corruption related
to an election or appointment, however, New Hampshire's constitution, in
emphatic terms, permanently disqualifies such persons from holding
office.286
10. New Mexico
In order to hold office, one must first be eligible to vote.287 Felons lose
the right to vote until their political rights are restored.28 8 A felon's voting
rights are restored upon completion of their sentence.289 In order to regain
eligibility to hold office, though, one must present the governor with "a
certificate verifying the completion of the sentence" and receive from the
governor a "pardon or certificate" restoring their rights. 290
Therefore, while New Mexico does not have any provisions
specifically disqualifying corrupt politicians from office, this procedure for
regaining political rights after conviction of any felony could act as a de
facto ban on all felons from holding office if a particular governor was so

281

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,

282 ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2,

m N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 602

(2016).

§ 7.

§ 607-A:2

(2016).

N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 640:2(1) (2016).
25 N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 38; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 39.
286
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 96.
2

287

N.M. CONST. art. 7,

288 N.M. STAT. ANN.

§ 2.
§ 31-13-1(A) (West 2015) (describing several avenues in which one can

have their political rights restored).
289 Id. § 31-13-1(A)(1).
290 Id. § 31-13-1(E). A bill that would have repealed this section died in committee
in 2015. 2015
NM S.B. 90; New Mexico Legislature, 2015 Regular Session, http://www.nrnegis.gov/lcs/egislation
.aspx?Chamber-S&LegType=B&LegNo90&year-15 [https://perma.cc/DAX8-4JQP].
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291

inclined.

Impeachment permanently
holding office. 29 2

disqualifies state officials from again

11. North Carolina

In order to hold office, one must be an eligible voter for the office they
seek.293 Persons convicted of a felony lose their right to vote until their
citizenship rights are restored.294 Such rights are automatically restored
when an offender either receives a pardon or is unconditionally discharged
from incarceration, probation, or parole.29 5
North Carolina's bribery statutes do not contain provisions for
candidate disenfranchisement beyond that triggered by the felonious nature
of the offense. 296 North Carolina does provide for forfeiture of retirement
benefits (except that which the member contributed, plus interest) upon a
public official's conviction for certain enumerated offenses related to
corruption of office.29 7 Impeachment does disqualify a state official from
ever holding office again.2
12. Oregon

'

Oregon presents a strikingly permissive approach to corrupt
politicians' eligibility for office. Oregon bars felons from voting and
holding office upon a sentence to incarceration.29 The right and privilege
are automatically restored upon completion of the sentence.3 " Officials
convicted of an "infamous crime" or who violate their oath of office vacate
their office.30
With respect to state legislators, a felony conviction during the term in
office or the period between election and the start of term forfeits the
office.302 Additionally, one cannot be elected as a state legislator unless
their full sentence-inclusive of probation and monetary fines-has been
completed and/or paid by the time they would take office if again

291 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-13-1 (West 2015) (requiring person seeking restoration
of the
privilege to obtain a pardon or certificate from the governor, but stopping short of explicitly mandating
the governor to provide such a document).

292 N.M. CONST. art. 4, § 36.
293 N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
29

4 N.C.
295

CONST. art. VI, § 2(3).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2016).
296 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-217, 14-218 (2016).
2
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 128-38.4, 128-38.4A (2016).
298 N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
299 OR. REV. STAT. § 137.281 (2015).

OR. REV. STAT.
3'2 OR. REV. STAT.
30

30 OR. CONST. art.

§ 137.281(7) (2015).
§ 236.010(1)(c).
IV, § 8(3).
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elected.303 However, one can run for legislative office before completing
their sentence and, if elected, they can take office so long as their sentence,
and thus, the term in which they were ineligible, is completed by the time
their term begins.304
Oregon's constitution does not contain an impeachment provision. A
provision for expelling legislators does not include provisions for
disqualification from office.3 0
13. Rhode Island*
Rhode Island is one state whose approach to candidate
disenfranchisement does not fit comfortably in one category. A three-year
disqualification follows the completion of a felony sentence but no
disqualification specific to corruption-related offenses exists. Persons
convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor which resulted in a jail sentence of
six months or more are disqualified from seeking or holding office until
three years after the completion of their sentence, including probation and
parole.306
Once the three-year period has elapsed, there is no further
disqualification from office for persons convicted of bribery. 30 7 Rhode
Island does, however, revoke or reduce the retirement benefits of officials
convicted of crimes "related to his or her public office or public
employment." 3 08 Rhode Island's provisions for impeachment of executive
or judicial officers only result in removal from office. 309
14. Texas
Texas has a de facto waiting period similar to Rhode Island's. All
felons are disqualified from holding office until they receive a pardon or
are "otherwise released from the [felony's] resulting disabilities." 310
Absent a pardon, this would require waiting two years following discharge
303 OR. CONST. art. IV, § 8(4).
304

OR. CONST. art. IV, § 8(6).
OR. CONST. art. IV, § 15. Despite efforts to pass a resolution to create an impeachment
provision by constitutional amendment, Oregon remains the only state without such a provision. Denis
305

C. Theriault, Oregon Impeachment Resolution Expected to Die in Senate, OREGONIAN (June 17, 2015),

http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/06/oregon impeachmentjplan dies i.htmi
[https://perma-cc/PP2X-SRQG]; House Joint Resolution 31, OREGONIAN, http://gov.oregonlive.
com/bill/2015/HJR31/ [https://perma.cc/2KYL-B9UDI (last visited Feb. 19, 2016) (noting the bill
remained in committee upon adjournment of the 2015 session).
306 R.I. CONST. art. Ill, § 2. The constitutional provision arose in 1985 and was passed by
statewide vote. State ex rel. Webb v. Cianci, 591 A2d 1193, 1202 (R.I. 1991). The legislature also
repealed a then-conflicting statute that had permanently disqualified from voting or holding office any
person who had been convicted to more than one year in prison. Id. at 1202-03.
307 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-7-3, 11-7-4, 11-7-5 (2016).
30 36 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10.1-3 (2016).
30 R.I. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
`l TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 141.001 (West 2016).
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from prison or completion of probation."'
Persons convicted of offering or giving a bribe to procure election or
appointment are permanently disqualified from holding office,312 but such
a disqualification does not extend to bribery unrelated to elections." A
conviction of the latter type would nonetheless forfeit one's office.3 14
Texas does permanently disqualify impeached officials from holding office
again.3 1 5

15. Utah*
Utah does not fit flush into one category. While there are no provisions
for disenfranchisement specific to public corruption offenses, all felons
must nonetheless wait for various periods of years before they may again

hold office.
Felons and persons convicted of any crime related to elections are
ineligible to vote or hold office until such rights or privileges are restored
to them.316 One is again eligible to hold office when they receive a pardon
or expungement or once ten years have passed since their most recent
felony conviction." But one is not eligible for expungement until a certain
period of time has passed since the completion of their sentence. 318 The
length of that period varies depending on the type of offense, ranging from
ten years in the case of driving under the influence, seven years for felonies
in general, and three years for any misdemeanor or infraction.3 19
Office holders convicted of bribery are discharged from office but are
not further disqualified than they are due to the offense's felony status,
which triggers a ten-year waiting period following the completion of the
sentence, or, if the conviction is expunged, a seven-year waiting period
from the date of expungement-presumably whichever comes first.320
Impeachment disqualifies an executive or judicial official from ever again
'

holding office.3 2

16. Vermont
Vermont neither limits one's eligibility to hold office nor their right to

" TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN.

§

11.002(4)(a) (West 2016).

TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 5.
313 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.02 (West 2016).
312

3 4

TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 41.

" TEX. CONST. art. XV, § 4.
316 UTAH CONST. art. IV, §
6.
3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-101.5 (West 2016).

31 UTAH CODE ANN.
319
Id.
320 UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-40-105
§§

311 UTAH CONST. art. VI,

(West 2016).

4-32-14, 77-40-105, 20A-2-101.5 (West 2016).

§ 19.
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Vermont's Constitution does render
vote upon conviction of a felony.
any candidate who bribes a voter during an election ineligible to hold
office for one year. 32 3 Only one class of state official-state's attorneys-is
barred from holding any office again upon conviction of bribery
generally.3 24 Otherwise, Vermont's bribery statute does not provide for
disqualification from office for any other state official convicted
thereunder.32 5 However, a bribery conviction may result in forfeiture of a
state official's retirement benefits. 326 An executive or judicial official who
is impeached is resultantly disqualified from ever again holding office.327
B. States that Take a Particularized Approach, Disenfranchising
Candidateswith Convictionsfor Public CorruptionOffenses
1. Alabama*
Alabama is one of several states that effectively disqualify all felons
from holding office and also have provisions specifically disqualifying
persons convicted of public corruption offenses.
Persons. who are not qualified electors cannot hold office in
Alabama.3 28 Felons lose their right to vote through the completion of their
sentence, at which point they must seek a certificate of eligibility to
register to vote from the state Board of Pardons and Parole.329 Absent
receipt of such a certificate or a pardon, a felon cannot vote and thus
cannot hold office.
Alabama presents something of a catch-all approach to candidate
disenfranchisement, disqualifying-in the same statutory provision-all
persons convicted of "treason, embezzlement of public funds, malfeasance
in office, larceny, [or] bribery," as well as all persons convicted of "any
other crime punishable by imprisonment in the state or federal
penitentiary," which would implicate all felons.330 The effect is to cover all
malfeasors in office and bribers, despite their avoiding imprisonment in the
penitentiary.
Alabama's constitution also disqualifies from public office any person
322 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 807 (West 2016) (permitting felons to vote by absentee ballot); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit 17, § 2353 (West 2016) (requiring only a candidate's submission of a petition
containing the requisite number of signatures to have their name printed on the ballot).

323 VT. CONST. ch. 11,
324
325
326

§ 55.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,

§ 365 (West 2016).
§ 1102 (West 2016).
§ 623 (West 2016).

327 VT. CONST. ch. II, § 58.
328 ALA. CODE § 36-2-1 (2016).
329

ALA. CODE

330 ALA. CODE

§ 15-22-36-1 (2016).
§ 36-2-l(a)(3) (2016); State ex rel. Sokira v. Burr, 580 So. 2d 1340, 1341
§ 36-2-1(a)(3) "specifically address[es] the effect of a felony conviction

1991) (noting that
person's qualification to hold public office") (emphasis added).

(Ala.
on a

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

1392

[Vol. 48: 1347

"convicted of embezzlement of the public money, bribery, perjury, or other
infamous crime."331
2. California
Felons serving prison sentences or periods of parole are disqualified
from voting. 3 32 Persons not qualified to vote are disqualified from holding
office.333 California's Constitution has long disenfranchised candidates
who gave or received bribes specifically to win election or receive an
appointment to state office.334 A statute passed in 2012 extended this
disqualification to persons convicted of offering or receiving a bribe,
regardless of the context.
It also includes as disqualifying offenses
"embezzlement of public money, extortion or theft of public money,
perjury, [and] conspiracy to commit any of those crimes."336
In addition to the disqualification on office-holding by proven corrupt
officials, California also disqualifies public employees convicted of those
same offenses from holding a public job for five years following
completion of their sentence.m
3. Colorado
Only those qualified as electors may hold office.338 Convicts cannot
vote until the completion of their sentence.
Colorado's Constitution
effects lifetime candidate disenfranchisement for persons convicted of
bribery, embezzlement of public moneys, perjury, solicitation of bribery,
and subornation of perjury. 340 Persons convicted of any other felony regain
the privilege to hold office upon completion of their sentence.34 1
Colorado's Constitution also provides a broad definition of bribery as
applied to the state's legislators and those who would attempt to buy their
influence.342 The definition includes direct and indirect receipt or
solicitation of money or favor in exchange for votes, influence, or action,

ALA. CONST. art. V, § 60.
.. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4.

CAL. ELEC. CODE § 201 (2016).
CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (disqualifying from holding "any office of profit in this State"
anyone "convicted of having given or offered a bribe to procure personal election or appointment").
335 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20 (2016). For a discussion of the events-including an election in which
California voters had no choice but to elect persons charged with offenses against the public trustwhich led to the enactment of § 20, see Heitz, supra note 108, at 640.
3 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20 (2016).
33 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1021.5 (2016).
... COLO. CONsT. art. Vil, § 6.
3

334

... COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
" COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 4.

1
34

CoLo. REV. STAT.

§ 18-1.3-401(3)

COLO. CONST. art. XII,

§ 7.

(2016).
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or the forbearance of the same.3 43 Vote-bartering amongst state legislators
is also termed bribery, though the disqualification for such an offense
extends only to state legislative office. 34
4. Delaware
Delaware's constitution disqualifies from holding office all persons
"convicted of embezzlement of the public money, bribery, perjury or other
infamous crime."3 45 This definition of "bribery" includes offering a bribe
to an official. 346 Even upon a pardon, persons convicted of bribery or like
public corruption offenses remain disqualified from holding office.3 47
Despite the inclusion of "infamous" crimes, not all felonies are necessarily
included in this class of offenses.3 4 8 The governor also has the power to
remove public officials who do not "behave themselves well," or those
who are "convicted of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime."349
5. Georgia*

'

Georgia is another state that does not fit comfortably into one of these
categories. While Georgia law all but disenfranchises persons convicted of
any felony lest they receive a pardon, a state statute additionally extends
that disqualification to persons convicted of public corruption offenses
specifically.
Once convicted of a "felony involving moral turpitude, punishable by
the laws of this State with imprisonment in the penitentiary," one may not
hold office unless both ten years have passed since the completion of their
sentence and their civil rights have been restored.350 Only a pardon will
restore a person's eligibility for office and can only be granted by the state
Board of Pardons.35
The Supreme Court of Georgia has taken "felony involving moral
turpitude, punishable by the laws of this State with imprisonment in the
penitentiary" to mean an offense that is both a felony-or, punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary-and that also "involve[s] moral
turpitude," though the Court's interpretation of this latter phrase has found

3

Id.
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 40.
345 DEL. CONST. art. II, § 21.
3

3
3
348

DEL. CONST. art. II, § 22; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1201 (West 2016).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4364 (West 2016).
In re Request of Governor for Advisory Opinion, 950 A.2d 651, 653 (Del. 2008) ("[N]ot every

felony is necessarily an 'infamous crime' within the meaning of Section 21. Rather, 'the totality of the

circumstances in each case must be examined before a determination may be made that a specific
felony is infamous."') (citations omitted).
4 DEL. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
3' GA. CONST. art. II, § 2, ¶ 3; GA. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1(3) (West 2016).
35 GA. CONST. art. IV, § 2,12; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-9-54, 45-2-1 (West 2016).
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all felonies to necessarily involve moral turpitude.

A Georgia statute ensures that crimes related to corrupting one's office
trigger this disqualification. Persons convicted of "fraudulent violation of
primary or election laws, malfeasance in office, or felony involving moral
turpitude" cannot hold office for ten years and only after their civil rights
are restored.353
6. Kansas
Upon conviction of any felony, one loses both their right to vote and
their eligibility to hold office, but only for the duration of their sentence.354
Sitting officials convicted of a felony forfeit their office.355 Public officials
convicted of soliciting or receiving bribes are forever disqualified from
holding office, as are those persons who bribed them.356
7. Maryland
Maryland disqualifies all felons from voting until they complete their
sentence. 5 One must be registered to vote in order to run for office. 35 8
Persons convicted of "buying or selling votes" are permanently
disqualified from voting and therefore from holding office.359 Persons
convicted of offering or giving a bribe to a public official or employee and
public officials and public employees convicted of demanding or receiving
a bribe are permanently disqualified from both holding office and
voting.3 60
8. Massachusetts
Massachusetts had not limited the voting rights of convicted felons
until 2000, when voters approved a statewide referendum by a roughly
sixty percent vote to amend the state's constitution to disqualify felons
from voting while incarcerated.361 The state legislature amended the
See Ramsey v. Powell, 262 S.E.2d 61, 62 (Ga. 1979) (analyzing an offense's effect on officeholding with both parts considered separately); Lewis v. State, 254 S.E.2d 830, 832 (Ga. 1979)
(indicating that "any crime designated as a felony and punishable by imprisonment would be a crime
352

involving moral turpitude").

3 GA. CODE ANN.
'

3ss
3
351
3 58

359

§ 21-2-8

(West 2016).

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6613 (West 2016).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2432 (West 2016).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6001 (West 2016).
MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-102 (West 2015).
MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 5-203 (West 2015).
MD. CONST. art. I, § 6; MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW

360 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW

§

§ 3-102

(West 2015).

9-201 (West 2015) ("A person who violates this section ...

may not vote; and may not hold an office of trust or profit in the State.").
3' MASS. CONST. amend. art. 3; Supreme Court Won't Hear Challenges to Mass. Bar on Voting

by Felony Inmates, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct 18, 2010), https://web.archive.org/web/2011112801400
0/http://www.boston.com/news/local/breakingnews/2010/10/supreme court w.html [https://perma.cc/
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relevant statute to the same effect in 2001.362
Massachusetts does not explicitly tie voting rights to eligibility for
office, but its constitution does disqualify from holding office anyone who
has been convicted of bribery or corruption in obtaining election or
appointment.36 3 That disqualification is extended by statute to all persons
convicted of intentionally engaging in a "quidpro quo" bribe in exchange
for influence over an official action.3 6 Public officials convicted of a
felony forfeit their office at the time of sentencing.365
9. Michigan
Michigan conditions eligibility for office on candidates' having the
right to vote, which is suspended upon a felony conviction for the duration
of incarceration.366 Michigan's constitution had long contained a provision
that imposed a twenty-year disqualification from holding certain state
offices on persons convicted of a public corruption offense. A 2010
Amendment to Michigan's constitution widened that limitation to include
all state, local, and federal offices, and state and local jobs in which the
individual -has discretionary authority over public assets. 3 67 The felonies
included are those "involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or a breach of the
public trust . . . related to the person's official capacity . . . (in) elective
office or position of employment in local, state, or federal government." 6 1
10. Minnesota
Persons convicted of "treason or felony" are disqualified from voting
until their civil rights are restored. 69 In order to hold office, one must be an
eligible voter.370 Voter eligibility is restored upon discharge of sentence,
PCR8-JJ4B]; Martin Finucane, Felons Denied Hearingon Bid to Vote, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2010,
at Metro 4.
362 MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 1 (2016); 2001 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 150 (H.B.
2883).
36

MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. 2.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268A, § 2 (2016); United States v. O'Brien, 994 F. Supp. 2d 167, 18990 (D. Mass. 2014) ("The Massachusetts bribery statute ... requires a quid pro quo, in which the giver
3

corruptly intends to influence an official act through a 'gift' and that 'gift' motivates an official to

perform an official act.").
36 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 279, § 30 (2016).
3
MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 7; MICH. CONST. art. 5, § 22; MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 46.411, 168.492a (2016).
6 MICH. CONST. art. 11, § 8; Elrick, supra note 92. Though no such challenge has yet been
made, Michigan's inclusion of federal office in its disqualification of certain felons from holding such
office, even for only a twenty-year period, almost certainly violates the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g.,
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995) ("Allowing individual States to adopt
their own qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a

uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States. If the qualifications set forth
in the text of the Constitution are to be changed, that text must be amended.").
3 MICH. CONST. art. 11, § 8.
361 MINN. CONST. art VII,
§ 1.
310 MINN. CONST. art. VH1, § 6.
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including probation and parole."'
Minnesota permanently disqualifies "public officers" convicted of
bribery offenses from holding public office.372 "Bribery" is defined as
directly or indirectly offering a bribe to a public officer in order to
influence them, as well.as a public officer's receipt or request of the
same.373
11. Mississippi*

Mississippi could be included in the particularized approach category
or the category of states that disqualify all felons from holding office in a
way similar to Georgia.
Persons convicted of "infamous crimes"-including, specifically,
bribery and embezzlement-are disqualified from voting and holding
office unless they receive a pardon.3 74 The term "infamous crimes"
includes all felonies save for certain offenses enumerated in article 4,
section 44 of the Mississippi Constitution. 7 If convicted of either offering
a bribe to a public official or receiving one as a public official, such
persons are permanently disqualified from holding office.376
12. Missouri
A felony conviction or a conviction of a crime "connected with the
right of suffrage" disqualifies one from voting.37 7 In order to hold state
office, one must be a "qualified voter for two years."
One holding either elected or appointed office who is convicted or
pleads guilty or nolo contendere to any felony or a crime "involving
misconduct in office or dishonesty" forfeits their current office. 7 Upon
completion of their sentence-including probation-one regains their
eligibility for office unless their crime was a "felony connected with the
exercise of the right of suffrage," in which case they are "forever
disqualified" from holding any office in the state and from voting.3 80
However, under the state's constitution, state legislators must take an
oath which includes a promise not to "knowingly receive, directly or
'
37
3
3

MINN. STAT. § 609.165 (2016).
MINN. STAT. § 609B.193 (2016).
MINN. STAT. § 609.42 (2016).
Miss. CONST. art. 12, § 241; MIss. CONST. art. 4,

§

44; Miss. CODE ANN.

§ 99-19-35

(West

2016).
1 Mauney v. State ex rel. Moore, 707 So. 2d 1093, 1096 (Miss. 1998) ('"[I]nfamous crime'
includes all felonies other than those specifically excluded in subsection 3 of Miss. CONST. art. 4,
§44.").
376 Miss. CODE. ANN. §§ 97-11-11, 97-11-13 (West 2015).

377 MO. CONST. art. VIII,

§ 2.

MO. CONsT. art. 111, § 4.
39 MO. ANN. STAT. § 561.021 (West 2015).
3
Id.
3
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indirectly, any money or other valuable thing for the performance or
nonperformance of any act or duty pertaining to [their] office, other than
the compensation allowed by law."381 Refusing to take the oath or violating
it-including its proscription against bribery-"forever disqualifie[s] [the
offender] from holding any office of trust or profit in [the] state."38 2
13. Montana
Upon conviction of a felony, an individual forfeits their voting rights
until they complete their sentence. 383 One must be an eligible voter to hold
office and the disqualification during a felony sentence is specifically
extended to holding office. 3 8 Both disqualifications cease upon completion
of the sentence.385 Any person who gives or accepts a bribe in
consideration of official influence is forever disqualified from holding
office.3 86
14. Nevada*
Nevada is similar to Mississippi and Georgia in its disenfranchisement
of candidates upon conviction of any felony, though the permanent "any
felony" disqualification is tied to persons convicted while in office and the
disqualification imposed on those not holding office at the time of
conviction lasts only four years following the completion of his or her
sentence.
In order to be eligible to hold office in Nevada, one must first be a
qualified elector. 387 Nevada disqualifies felons from voting until their civil
rights are restored.38 While voting rights are restored immediately upon
completion of sentence-including parole-there is an additional four-year
disqualification before one regains eligibility to hold office. 8
An office holder convicted of any felony or a crime involving
"malfeasance in office" forfeits their current office and is disqualified from
ever again holding office.3 90 Any person convicted of embezzlement,
offering or receiving a bribe in order "to procure his election or
appointment to office," or receiving a bribe to "aid in the procurement of
office for any other person" is also disqualified from holding office. 39 1

381 MO. CONST. art. 1II,
38 2

§ 15.

Id.

383 MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
384 MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
31 MONT. CONST. art. I, § 28.
386 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-101 (West 2016).
387
38

NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.040 (2016).

8 NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.157 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.155 (2016).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 197.230 (2016).
31
' NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
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15. New Jersey
To be eligible for state legislative office, one must be eligible to
vote.392 The same requirement does not expressly extend to the office of
the governor.3 93 One loses their right to vote upon conviction of a crime for
the duration of incarceration, parole, and/or probation.394
One convicted of a crime involving public corruption-or, an offense
"involving or touching on [public] office"-is permanently disqualified
from holding office.3 9 5 Such crimes are defined generally as those "related
directly to the person's performance in, or circumstances flowing from, the
specific public office, position or employment held by the person. "396
16. New York
One in prison or on parole for a felony in New York may nonetheless
pursue public office, though they cannot vote during that time.397 Under a
state statute, one is forever disqualified from holding office upon their
conviction of any of the following felonies: giving or receiviig a bribe as a
public servant, 398 corrupting the government or public corruption,399 or
defrauding the government while a public servant.4 0
If one is convicted of a misdemeanor under any of these statutes, he or
she is only disqualified from holding office for five years from the date of
the conviction. 401 If that misdemeanor conviction results from plea
agreements made to avoid a felony conviction, they are banned for ten
years.40 2
Upon conviction of a felony or a crime involving a violation of the
oath of office, a public official forfeits the office.403
17. North Dakota
A felony conviction in North Dakota disqualifies one from voting,
running for office, or holding office until the period of their incarceration
ends, at which point the rights are automatically restored.404 If in office at

3

N.J. CONST. art. 4,
393 N.J. CONST. art. 5,

§ 1, ¶2.
§ 1, ¶ 2.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:51-3(a) (West 2015).
395 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:51-2 (West 2015).
3
Id.
3 N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 7; N.Y. CONST. art. 4, § 2; N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106 (McKinney 2015).
3 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 200.00 (McKinney 2015).
3
E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 496.05 (McKinney 2015).
40 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.20 (McKinney 2015); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 3(1-a)(i)-(ii)
(McKinney 2015).
401 Id.
402 Id.
40 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 30(1)(e) (McKinney 2015).
404 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-33-01 (2015).
394
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the time of the conviction, the offender forfeits their office.405
North Dakota's constitution contains several provisions specific to
particular state offices providing for permanent candidate disqualification
for certain offenses, which can be described generally as receiving a bribe
for official action or offering official influence or action in exchange for
benefit or a quid pro quo for another official's action, forbearance, or
influence.406 Persons convicted of "infamous crimes," bribery, or perjury
are also ineligible for state legislative office.407 A city official's bribery
conviction will also forfeit their office. 4 08
The state's judiciary-as well as the governor-are liable for
impeachment if found guilty of offenses including crimes, corrupt conduct,
or malfeasance in office, resulting in lifetime disqualification from

office. 4 09
18. Ohio
Ohio also stands out as a state which at once takes the particularized
approach but also provides for sweeping candidate disenfranchisement of
all felons. A person convicted of a felony loses their right to vote until the
completion of their sentence. 4 10 Such persons are also permanently
disqualified from holding office unless they receive a pardon.4 11 If a public
official or employee is found guilty of bribery, they are forever disqualified
from holding office.4 12 If one is convicted of embezzling public funds they
are permanently disqualified from holding office. 4 13 A public servant
convicted of soliciting "improper compensation"-as distinct from a bribe,
per se-for their service is disqualified from holding office for seven years
4 14
following their conviction.

40

Id

N.D. CONST. art. V, § 10 (relating to the governor); N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (relating to state
legislators but limiting the prohibited acts to vote trading).
4 N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
40 N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-06-06 (2015).
4
N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 10.
410 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 (West 2015).
411 Id.
412 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.02 (West 2015).
411 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 5.
414 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.43 (West 2015). The improper compensation statute has been
interpreted to prohibit teachers from accepting compensation for tasks ancillary to their position, such
as mentoring student teachers or hosting students completing field work, Ohio Ethics Op. 2011-05
(June 17, 2011), but not to include a State Highway Patrol vehicle inspector's acceptance of donuts
and pizza from dealers who regularly had their vehicles inspected, State v. Livesay, 91 Ohio Misc. 2d
208, 214 (Com. Pl. 1998) ("If a person gets friendly service from the personnel of a public office with
whom he works regularly and brings in a box of donuts one day, and the staff eats the donuts, has a
crime been committed? Is this what the legislature intended when it prohibited illegal compensation?
We think not.").
4
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19. South Carolina*
South Carolina's approach is similar to Nevada's in its term-of-years
disqualification from office for any person convicted of a felony and its
additional permanent disqualification for persons convicted of public
corruption offenses. South Carolina disqualifies from holding office all
persons convicted of a felony or an election crime for the duration of their
sentence, including probation and parole, plus an additional fifteen
years. 415 A pardon would immediately lift the disqualification. Upon
conviction of giving or receiving a bribe, or attempting either, an
individual is permanently disqualified from holding office.416
20. South Dakota
Anyone sentenced to a term of imprisonment-even if that sentence is
suspended-is disqualified from seeking or holding office until the
sentence's completion.4 17 A conviction of bribery of a public officialeither the giver or receiver-will forfeit one's office and forever disqualify
them from holding office.418 South Carolina's constitution bars from
holding any office in the legislature persons who have been convicted of
bribery, perjury, or "other infamous crime."4 19 It is not clear what would
constitute an "infamous crime" in South Dakota, though statutory
provisions specific to legislators also permanently disqualify from holding
office those convicted of certain offenses related to the operation of the
legislature.420
21. Tennessee
A felony conviction in Tennessee renders one "infamous" and so
disqualifies one from voting, 421' a right returned upon meeting conditions
more or less arduous depending on the date of conviction.422 Conviction of
an infamous crime (a felony) 423 immediately disqualifies one from seeking
or holding office until that person regains their voting rights.424 For sitting
officials who commit a felony in their official capacity or in a way
involving their official duties, however, the disqualification from holding
office is permanent-regardless of subsequent restoration of their
citizenship rights-though the circumstances do not have any additional
VI, § 1.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-705 (West 2016).
417 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-35
(2015).
418 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-12A-10; see also S.D. CONST.
art. III, § 28.
419 S.D. CONST. art. III,
§ 4.
420 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-4-13
(2015).
421 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-112 (West
2015)
422 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-105 (West
2015).
423 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-112 (West
2015).
424 Id.
411 S.C. CONST. art
416
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effect on their voting rights. Impeachment from a state office forever
disqualifies one from holding office again.4 26
22. Virginia
One loses their right to vote upon conviction of a felony. 4 27 In order to
hold office, one must be eligible to vote.4 28 If a state official or candidate
for public office receives any gift or promise in relation to their official
function, they are guilty of a felony and forever disqualified from holding
office.4 29 "Public servants" convicted of either giving or receiving a bribe
are also so disqualified, which implicates local officials. 430
23. Washington*
Washington takes the "just corrupt politicians, but also all felons"
approach to candidate disenfranchisement, but-like Nevada-only sitting
public officials are exposed to the disqualification upon conviction of any
felony at all.
A person convicted of an "infamous crime" is ineligible to vote.43 In
order to hold office, one must be a qualified elector.4 32 State and municipal
officers convicted of "bribery or corrupt solicitation" are permanently
barred from holding office.4 3 3 Public officials convicted of "any felony or
malfeasance in office" forfeit their office and are disqualified from holding
office in the future.4 34 Impeachment for malfeasance in office also effects
permanent disqualification from office for state officials. 43 5
24. West Virginia
West Virginia disqualifies any person who bribes or attempts to bribe
an elected official from ever holding office as well as any official who
receives or solicits as much. 436 Another statute disqualifies from office
persons convicted of "treason, felony, or bribery in any election," unless
the conviction is reversed.437 An amendment to this statute proposed in
425

426

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-20-114(b)

(West 2015).

TENN. CONST. art. V, § 4.
427
VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
428
VA. CONST. art. II, § 5.
429 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-439 (West 2015).
430

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-447, 18.2-449 (West 2016).

431 WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
432 WASH. CONST. art. III, § 25; WASH. CONST. art. II,

§

7; WASH. REV. CODE

§

42.04.020

(2016).
43 WASH. CONST. art. 11,

§ 9A.68.010

§ 30; WASH.

REV. CODE

§ 35A.42.050

(West 2016) (defining "bribery").
43 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.120 (2016) (emphasis added).
435 WASH. CONST. art. V, § 2.
436
W. VA. CODE § 61-5-5 (2016).
437 W. VA. CODE § 6-5-5 (2016).

(2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
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2015 would have added domestic violence and fraud to the list of
offenses. 43 8
25. Wyoming
Persons convicted of felonies lose their right to vote. 4 3 9 In order to be
eligible for elected or appointed office, one must be a qualified elector."o
These provisions are combined in a statute."' Wyoming's state
constitution provides for lifetime disqualification from office for any state
officer found guilty of bribery or corrupt solicitation." 2
As for lay persons convicted of felonies who lose their right to vote
and with it their right to hold office, only if they have their conviction
reversed or annulled or receive a pardon or restoration of their civil rights
from the governor will they regain the right to hold office." 3 If one has
their civil rights restored by way of petition to the state Board of Parole,
they would not regain their eligibility to hold office. 4" Impeachment also
results in disqualification from holding office for state officials."
C. States that Disenfranchise Candidateswith Any Felony Conviction
1. Arkansas
Arkansas had long disqualified from holding office persons convicted
of "embezzlement of public money, bribery, forgery or other infamous
crime" under its state constitution."' An amendment passed in 2015 added
a definition of "infamous crime" to that provision so that now all felonies
are expressly incorporated under the disqualification provision." 7
2. Indiana
Indiana's statute disqualifies both all felons from holding office in the
state as well as any person who offers a bribe to procure election." The
disqualification from holding office can only be lifted by pardon, reversal
of the conviction, vacating the sentence, or expungement." 9 A felony
conviction while in office forfeits the office. 4 50
H.B. 2040, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015).
WYo. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
* WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 15.
"' WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-106(a) (West 2016).
"'WYo. CONST. art. lII, §§ 42,44; WYO. CONST. art. IV § 10.
"3 WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-106 (West 2016).
" Id.; WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-105(b), (c) (West 2016).
" WYO. CONST. art. 111, § 18.
6
4 ARK. CONST. art. V, § 9.
44 2015 Arkansas Laws Act 1027.
"" IND. CONST. art. II, § 6; IND. CODE § 3-8-1-5 (2016).
"' IND. CODE § 3-8-1-5 (2016).
4 IND. CODE § 5-8-1-38 (2016).
438

4
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3. Iowa
Iowa does not expressly disqualify all felons from holding office, but
in its provision of a felony conviction as grounds for challenging a
person's election, such persons are effectively so disqualified.
One convicted of an "infamous crime" loses his or her right to vote
absent a pardon by the governor or president.4 5 1 In order to be eligible to
hold office, one must first be an eligible elector.452 But the Supreme Court
of Iowa has held that the mention of "infamous crime" in article II, section
5 of the Iowa Constitution does not connote all felonies. 4 5 3
Nonetheless, one ground for contesting an election in Iowa is the
winning candidate's previous conviction of a felony, 4 54 which would seem
to effectively screen out all felons from holding office, either after an
election through a challenge or prior to running for fear of such a
challenge.
4. Kentucky
Under the Kentucky Constitution, any felony conviction disqualifies
one from holding office unless they receive a pardon from the governor.4 55
5. Louisiana
In Louisiana, all felons are disqualified from holding office until their
sentences are completed and, absent a pardon, an additional fifteen years
have passed.4 5 6

6. Nebraska
In order to hold office in Nebraska, one must first be a registered
voter. 457 Felons are disqualified from voting until two years after the
completion of their sentence. 458 Nebraska permanently disqualifies all
felons from holding office unless they receive a pardon, in which case the
privileges restored to them still may be limited.459
"' IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5; IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 16; IOWA CODE §§ 914.1-914.3, 48A.6
(2016).
452 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 39.27, 39.26 (West 2016).
. Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 853-54, 856 (Iowa 2014). While the Chiodo
court acknowledged that the framers of the Iowa Constitution "clearly understood that an 'infamous

crime' and a 'felony' had different meanings," id., it stopped short of precisely defining the term,
instead offering that "the crime must be classified as particularly serious, and it must be a crime that
reveals that voters who commit the crime would tend to undermine the process of democratic
governance through elections," id at 856.
4

IOWA CODE

4ss KY. CONST.
4
45 7

4

§ 57.1
§ 150.

(2016).

LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 20; LA. STAT. ANN.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-602 (2016).

" NEB. REV. STAT.
45 Id.

§ 29-112

(2016).

§§

18:451, 18:461 (West 2015).

1404

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1347

7. Oklahoma
If convicted of a felony while in office in Oklahoma, any state
officer-including appellate judges-forfeits his or her office. 4 ' All felons
and anyone convicted of misdemeanors involving embezzlement are
disqualified from running or holding office for a period of fifteen years
following the completion of sentence.46 Disqualification is permanent for
state legislators, though: Oklahoma's Constitution provides that no person
found guilty of a felony may be elected to the state's legislature.462
Expulsion for corruption also bars a legislator from ever again holding a
seat in that body.463
8. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania disqualifies all felons from holding office by way of a
constitutional provision that states "[n]o person hereafter convicted of
embezzlement of public moneys, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime,
shall be eligible to the General Assembly, or capable of holding any office
of trust or profit in this Commonwealth." The definition of "infamous
crime" includes all felonies. 4 65
9. Wisconsin
Under Wisconsin's Constitution, all felons convicted of a felony in any
court are disqualified from holding office unless they receive a pardon.6
This limitation is also extended to misdemeanants whose offenses are
related to the public trust.4 67

§ 1.
4' OKLA. STAT. tit 26, § 5-105a (2016).
2
4 OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 18.
43 OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 19.
4 PA. CONST. art. 11, § 7.
4" Commonwealth ex rel Corbett v. Griffin, 596 Pa 549, 560 (2008) (holding that the
legislature's classification of a crime as a felony controls the question of whether it is infamous); see
also Commonwealth ex rel. Kearney v. Rambler, 613 Pa. 32, 45 (2011) (declining to adopt a bright-line
rule to treat out-of-state felonies as infamous crimes).
46 WIS. CONST. art. X111, § 3.
7
Id
4 OKLA. CONST. art. VIll,
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